

The Constraining Effects of Security Communities: Military Integration and Government Repression

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As the breadth and depth of international military cooperation expands, security communities become increasingly developed. These communities are sub-systems of intense multilateral cooperation, and as such they have consequences for state behavior. For example, integrated states have difficulty taking actions in opposition to others in their community while isolated states are less constrained but lack the cooperative benefits a community provides. Extending this logic and motivated by the events of the Arab Spring, I argue that integration with Western liberal democracies constrains non-Western states from using lethal repression against their citizens. In Western states, restraint from using lethal repression is a well-established behavioral norm. Violators of this norm face consequences, and so does the violator's strategic partners. Therefore, Western liberal democracies have incentives to coerce their non-Western partners from engaging in such behaviors. The theory put forth is empirically tested using government repression and social protest data from 1981 – 2006. Military cooperation is estimated as a latent trait expressed by multiple distinct and observable policy-choices, and military integration is measured using the social network concepts of degree centrality and eigenvector centrality. I find empirical evidence that increased military integration with Western liberal democracies significantly decreases a state's likelihood of using lethal repression against its citizens, thus demonstrating one constraining effect of a community structure. Other state behaviors affected by military integration and the development of security communities are discussed, but empirical assessment is left for future work.

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The fundamental problem of international politics and organization is the creation of conditions under which stable, peaceful relations among nation states are possible and likely. Ultimately each nation's security must be assured through the existence of a community embracing all nations.

–Karl Deutsch (1970, p. 33)

The increasing integration of the world's military structures facilitates the development of security communities throughout the international system, and these communities of military cooperation have consequences for state behavior. For example, integrated states have difficulty taking actions against the wishes of others in their community while isolated states are not subject to those same constraints. As recognized by Deutsch, understanding the behavioral effects of these community structures is of primary importance to our understanding of international relations and of state behavior.

The fundamental mechanism responsible for the development of communities of military cooperation is the loss of autonomy for the state military and the linking of security issues among states. While several characteristics can be labeled as causal, one phenomenon positively associated with this trend is ability for individuals and small groups of people who are dissatisfied with the status quo to cause turmoil in the international system. As the empowerment of the individual increases and threats to the state become increasingly "small," military integration becomes increasingly necessary. As military cooperation increases, states are not just responsible for their security but also for that of others. Thus, we observe the development of a security community through a reinforcing process whereby security structures integrate to meet "small" threats that become smaller as a result of the integration itself.

Belonging to a community of military cooperation has both enabling and constraining effects. For example, security communities make possible the pursuit of policies that would not have otherwise been attainable by a single state or a set of states with independent security policies. Using a process I refer to as foreign policy transmission, states can project their desired foreign policies onto their network, generating verbal and material support for their actions by linking their desired outcomes with the security of other community members. Large-scale, costly policies become more

attainable as they are broken down into smaller, more manageable elements that are executed by members of the community in the name of a common security interest.

Communities of military cooperation can also have a constraining effect on state behavior. Following the uprisings of the Arab Spring, Libya and Syria both decided to use large-scale military force against their citizens while Egypt's military was more restrained. Although its response was severe, Bahrain opted out of lethal government repression and instead accepted assistance from the Gulf Cooperation Council's Peninsula Shield Force to restore order. Smaller protests in Jordan and Morocco were met without widespread violent repression.

In many ways, these states and their situations were quite similar, as each is an Arab state led by a longtime dictator. The protesters in each expressed similar frustrations based on the lack of representation in government, economic stagnation, and poor living conditions (Goldstone, 2011). Each uprising had a common impetus in the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia. Why, then, did some governments resort to lethal repression while others did not?

I argue that, in the case of the Arab Spring and more generally, states that are integrated with Western liberal democracies, and therefore embedded in the Western security community, are less likely to use such repression against their citizens. In Western states, restraint from using lethal repression is a well-established behavioral norm. Violators of this norm face consequences, and so does the violator's strategic partners. Therefore, Western liberal democracies have incentives to coerce their partners from engaging in such behaviors.

An effective avenue for Western coercion is through the military as opposed to coercion through the government. Lethal repression is only possible when the military or some other security force is willing to engage in such acts (Sharp, 2008). The theory is expanded below, but the key element is that the repression costs for the military increase as a state becomes more integrated into a security community with norms against such repression. Arms transfers, training, participation in international missions, military exercises, student exchange programs, not to mention the formal alliance and various other defense cooperation agreements, are all beneficial to the development of the military and all are at risk should the military abuse its power. The government, on the other hand, will often face an insurmountable cost for *not* repressing—specifically, the government may be removed from power. It is therefore expected that non-Western states integrated with Western liberal democracies are less likely to use overt military violence on their population.

I test the constraining theory of military integration using government repression and protests data from 1981 – 2006. Military cooperation is estimated as a latent trait expressed by distinct and observable policy-choices. Military integration is measured using the social network concepts of degree centrality and eigenvector centrality as it relates to one’s relationship with OECD states, the institution used to distinguish Western liberal democracies.

I find supportive evidence for the theory that increased military integration significantly decreases a state’s likelihood of using lethal repression against its citizens. This is the case for two ordered logit models, each utilizing a different measure of government repression, and for a selection model that tests the “responsive repression” theory, as discussed in the situations of the Arab Spring. Although supportive, these results are rather preliminary and further work is necessary to better understand the constraining effects of military integration on government repression.

Security Communities and State Behavior

Realist alliance theory suggests that, in an anarchic international system, security is best provided by the aggregation of power achieved through formal alliances (Morgenthau, 1947; Liska, 1968). However, the same theorists (and others) note that security is also provided by your friends and their willingness and ability to use not just military power, but political pressures in your favor. For example, in the case of the Syrian Civil War Russia does not need to provide the Assad regime with weapons (although it does) to provide them with security. Russia can use its veto power on the United Nations Security Council to prevent an intervention supported by the UN or to provide Syrians with the impression that there is not a unified international opinion against the regime. More generally, third-parties to a conflict can act to prevent other third-parties from intervening in meaningful ways by using purely political power without ever threatening or alluding to military action. These network effects become increasingly influential as (1) militaries continue to integrate and states cede autonomy over particular security issues and (2) the scope of threats that the military is responsible for continues to expand.

The militaries of today are tasked with providing security for themselves and for others from a host of threats, many of which were irrelevant for the militaries of just twenty-five years ago. These unconventional threats may be characterized as “extra-state,” meaning they are not emerg-

ing directly from the state itself but from some other entity. They include terrorism, narcotics trafficking, natural disasters, piracy, and cyber-security. Modern threats also include destabilizing events such as popular uprisings, state failure, and civil war. To meet such threats in addition to those more conventional, states are increasingly turning towards various forms of military cooperation. By acting for a common objective, militaries become more powerful. By sharing resources, they become more efficient. By integrating, two or more states enter into a relationship that comes with stabilizing benefits.

The expanding nature of the threat is not limited to Western militaries or US interests. Russia and the former Soviet states routinely drill counter-terrorism exercises, as does China and its neighboring partners. The United Nations, which may be a vehicle for Western interests, nonetheless supplies peacekeeping forces comprised mostly of non-Western nationals to areas all over the globe. Regional security organizations exist in most regions of the world. The expanding threat is fueled largely by the empowerment of the individual in the Information Age, and part of that empowerment is the fact that individuals from anywhere can cause turmoil everywhere. More unified defenses are necessary to combat such threats.

The unification of security structures presents challenges to our understanding of state behavior. Military integration creates complex security communities in the international system and the effects of such communities on state behavior are little understood.¹ This is an idea that has its theoretical and empirical roots in the work of Karl Deutsch. When groups of people or states have integrated past the point where armed conflict among them is no longer planned for, Deutsch refers to them as security communities (Deutsch et al., 1969; Deutsch, 1970). Such communities can be pluralistic, meaning actors retain independence, or amalgamated, meaning once-independent entities have merged into one. Deutsch (1970) notes that this definition of security communities is actually an ideal-type and that less-integrated communities certainly do exist. That is, there is a continuous, latent dimension to such communities. Using network metrics and data on military cooperation we can estimate that latent dimension.

It is impossible to understand the nature of community behavior and its effects without considering the security apparatus that underlies such behavior. The communities of states in the current

¹In this chapter I use the terms military cooperation and military integration interchangeably, for stylistic purposes. Military integration can also refer to a joint chain of command, as is the case with NATO and the US-ROK Alliance, but that is not the intention here.

system are more than just a web of formal alliances to promote state security. They are based on a set of cooperative policies that collectively do two things: reduce the autonomy of the state military and link state security to that of the community.

“Autonomy” is used with respect to the state’s ability or desire to respond to a given threat without the assistance of others. Almost by definition, a state will have more autonomy over responding to domestic threats targeting the state than to foreign ones targeting other states. However, it is clear that in many places even domestic threats to stability are not met with a fully domestic response. Weapons, logistics, and technology are frequently provided by others. Infrastructure is commonly built and utilized by foreign powers. Security becomes linked as states are increasingly unable to provide security independent of one another. As a result, as military cooperation increases states are increasingly responsible for each others’ security and for the security of their citizens.

State and Community Behaviors

For well-integrated states, one behavior enabled by a community structure is that of *foreign policy transmission*.² Foreign policy transmission refers to the property whereby a state can transmit its policy objective to its community, and the community or some other member of the community who is more capable or able pursue that policy. In this way, we see states acting on behalf of others in the name of their security, a fundamental motivation for state behavior that is extremely difficult to model with a state-year or dyad-year research design.

The complete transmission of a foreign policy objective is rare; more common is partial transmission. In such cases, a well-integrated security community can pursue certain elements of a policy. For example, the French intervention in Mali came with substantial support from other European powers, including each of the other 21 European countries that have contributed personnel to the European Union Training Mission to Mali.³ The mission is responsible for training the Malian army, a necessary accomplishment for France and peacekeepers to withdraw and not have Mali return to a state of civil war. Even with France having the desire to intervene, in a completely independent world the rest of Europe is indifferent to events in Mali. However, the security interests

²I would like to thank Stephen Kraffmiller for suggesting this term.

³*Turning Mali’s Army Into a Fighting Force* by Alex Duval Smith. BBC News, Bamako. 02 May 2013. Accessed at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22391857> on 15 July 2013.

of Europe are closely linked and by virtue of foreign policy transmission France has gained support for an intervention and, ultimately, a UN peacekeeping operation.

Foreign policy objectives may also be legitimized with community support. Perhaps a state cannot successfully transmit its policy objective to members of the community, but it can garner community support. Community support for peacekeeping operations, support for rebels, and support for regimes and parties in power is a very significant means of justification for taking action. It acts as a credible signal for state action, not unlike that of raising domestic audience costs (Fearon, 1994; Shultz, 2001; Partell and Palmer, 1999). For example, even in cases where there is no material support, it is a credible signal to the target when one state publicizes its willingness to act and other members of its community verbally support that action.

This is just one example of how a community structure may affect state behavior. From another perspective, as community cooperation increases it may increasingly appear to behave as a single entity. One behavior that a community might engage in is referred to as *poaching*. Poaching is a cooperative behavior that takes place when a state or group of states acts to integrate others into their community. This may be done through entirely cooperative means and does not need to involve military conflict. For example, holding new joint military exercises or opening up a new channel of military aid are tools for poaching a state and bringing it into the community's fray.

One primary example of poaching took place at the end of the Cold War in NATO's Partnership for Peace program. With the Soviet Union collapsing and Russia's network of military cooperation in remission, NATO established a plan for integrating many of the former Communist states into its security community. This plan included, among other things, joint military exercises, military aid, and the opportunity to have a greater role in peacekeeping operations (de Santis, 1994). As a result, several former Soviet allies are now full members of NATO.

Poaching serves the function of expanding the community, establishing buffers against competing communities and increasing cooperative avenues within. The likelihood of a state being the target of poachers is a function of both the costs and the benefits of doing so. A well-integrated state is less likely to be a target because poaching comes at a higher cost. Members of the same community as the potential poachee will not appreciate foreign intervention and will act to prevent it. Isolated states, or those who lack any meaningful military integration, are easy targets for communities to mobilize against. Poaching is also a function of the benefits and not all states provide

benefits worthy of poaching. Indicators increasing the benefits include factors such as geographic proximity, resource-endowments, wealth, and its relationships with other states.

Continuing with community-level behaviors, states also engage in *herding*. In well-integrated networks, a weak link poses problems for the entire community by virtue of linked security policies. Weak states may be the target of poachers or they may be plagued with domestic pressures (which may be fomented by poachers as well). So when a member of a security community is weakened, it can be expected that members of that community will come to its aid. Historical examples of herding include the Soviet Union's intervention in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. It also includes Russia's intervention in Georgia in 2008. In each case, a well-integrated state (or territory, in the case of South Ossetia) is being supported by its community to prevent defection or further political unrest.

Foreign policy transmission, poaching, and herding are just a sample of the ways that communities of military cooperation behave and affect state behavior. To provide a more theoretical insight into the effects of military cooperation on state behavior, the community effects on a government's use of lethal repression is examined in more detail. Included are brief anecdotes from the Arab Spring and some preliminary large-n empirical analyses.

A Theory of Government Repression

According to Davenport (2007), "it is generally believed that political leaders in authoritarian systems use repression for three reasons: (1) they lack viable alternatives for political control, (2) they suffer no consequences for taking such action, and (3) there are generally no effective mechanisms for countering/checking the coercive power of authorities within such governments" (p. 10). Research on autocratic forms of government suggest that autocracies do face costs for their actions, only perhaps not as often or as strong as in a democracy (Weeks, 2008; Wright, 2008). Regardless, there may be no *effective* checks on power within the state, but external constraints surely do exist. Such constraints may be particularly strong when the autocratic regime has befriended a state where the norms of peaceful political expression and protest are protected.

With respect to government repression, "as people have generally accepted the norms of the human rights movement, codified in national constitutions as well as in regional and international

legal documents, repressive behavior has come to be considered morally as well as legally reprehensible throughout the world” (Davenport, 2007, p. 34). But, it is a practice that is engaged in nonetheless because it is *domestically* a low-cost option, especially for dictatorships who face fewer constraints and less domestic costs than democracies. Liberal democracies have incentives to persuade violators of such abuses from engaging in these practices and they attempt to do so through a variety of foreign policies, including signing human rights agreements and by issue linkages through trade agreements (Hafner-Burton, 2005). Ironically, however, a leading mechanism by which governments are dissuaded from violent repression has little to do with dissuasion from violent repression.

When one enters into a relationship whereby their militaries cooperate with liberal democracies, they implicitly agree to abide by certain behavioral norms or, at the very least, can be coerced to abide by such norms as a result of the leverage provided by their integration. Chief among those norms is to abstain from the use of lethal government repression. In the West, this is a well-established behavioral norm and neither domestic audiences nor democracies look kindly upon its infraction anywhere. Furthermore, when a foreign power uses lethal repression against its citizens, not only are there international repercussions for the repressing state but its strategic partners face consequences as well. Therefore, members of one’s community have incentives to coerce one another from resort to violent repression.

This is a rather straightforward argument related to normative constraints (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001; Sikkink, 2009) with nothing particularly unique to military cooperation other than it provides an additional means for leverage. The same argument could be applied to international trade, institutional membership, or any other channel by which states gain leverage over one another. However, military integration serves an additional function that is not found in other pathways by which norms are transferred. Namely, leverage over *military* action.

Integral to government repression is a security force that is willing to repress (Sharp, 2008). This can be the military, a police force, or some other domestic security force. Occasionally, in military dictatorships the military and the political are one entity. More often than not, however, they are distinct and often competing entities within the state (Belkin and Schofer, 2003). When the military is requested to repress its citizens, the leaders of the military make the decision to repress, side with the protesters, or do nothing. The same can be said of a police force asked to

repress.⁴ This is related to the formal model of government repression by Pierskalla (2010).

In a situation where lethal repression is being considered there are two actors – the government and the military – who face different costs and benefits. Assume that neither faces significant domestic costs for repression. However, external costs will be imposed on both the government and the military for repression. Perhaps they come in the standard form of targeted sanctions, international shaming, and an increase in isolation from one’s community of military cooperation.

For the government, the cost for not repressing may result in the removal from power. Seeing as it is a common assumption in the IR literature that governments act to remain in power, such a cost is insurmountable (Downs and Rocke, 1994; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999). Therefore, when there exists a domestic threat significant enough to result in the loss of power, we should expect the government to respond with lethal repression.

For the military, however, the cost for not repressing *is not* an insurmountable cost. Should the government fall, the military, as an institution, will typically persist and possibly even do so with few changes. In fact, not repressing may be a way for the military to establish credibility and good-terms with the new government. What the military does risk, however, is the possibility of government survival. If the government survives, and the military did not obey its command to repress, there will certainly be consequences.⁵

Influencing the decision of the military is also the disproportionate allocation of the costs of repression. In general, the military is responsible for security and integration into a security community eases the burdens associated with providing security for the state and its citizens. As an institution, the military is the principal recipient of many of the benefits of military cooperation. Arms transfers, training, participation in international missions, military exercises, student exchange programs, not to mention the formal alliance and various other defense cooperation agreements are all beneficial to the development of the military and all are at risk should the military abuse its power.

Liberal democracies may capitalize on this source of power by using it as leverage against the

⁴If the police force is violently repressing the citizens, it is unlikely to do so without the implicit approval of the military, since if the military disapproves it is stronger than the police force and can forcibly stop the repression. Below, I simply refer to the repressing forces as the military.

⁵As a caveat, should the military be of a similar ethnicity to that of the government and of a different ethnicity to that of the protesters, the institution of the military will likely not survive the regime change. In such cases, the military faces the same costs as the government (i.e. a loss of power) and so should be expected to use lethal repression. A good case in point for this caveat is that of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

use of large-scale violence directed towards the citizens of partner-states. In this way, the policies adopted for the purposes of security integration are used as a tool for coercing the institution of the military. Further isolating an already isolated state has little effect, but cutting off ties with a well-integrated state could have widespread consequences for its military.

In a sense this is an application of interdependence theory and it applies to military cooperation just as it does to economic cooperation (Keohane and Nye Jr., 1977; Russett and Oneal, 2001). Branching out of Liberalism, interdependence is often stated in economic terms whereby states will not go to war with one another when they are sufficiently strong trading partners because the costs of war will simply outweigh the benefits (Hegre, Oneal and Russett, 2010). Interdependence need not be strictly economic and the effects need not be limited to a reduced probability of war. Hafner-Burton (2005) makes a similar argument with respect to government repression and the signing of preferential trade agreements. As more states become militarily integrated, certain applications of military force become less acceptable. In particular, military cooperation with liberal democracies discourages violent government repression.

Arab Spring, Government Repression, and Community Effects

Rarely has history provided a chain of events like those that have unfolded since the Arab Spring began in late 2010. Such large-scale, widespread popular uprisings are rare, but as many have noted they do happen and when they do, they are often compared to one another (Weyland, 2012). Within a single uprising, the states and places that experience unrest are also compared to one another. On many dimensions, the states that have experienced uprisings are similar—they are all Arab states ruled by dictators who have been in power for decades. The protests have largely been the result of common frustrations stemming from a lack of representation in government, economic stagnation, and poor living conditions (Goldstone, 2011). In the quantitative social sciences, we commonly make generalizations about units of analysis based on observable attributes that are far less uniform than those observed as part of the Arab Spring. Yet, if we were to generalize about the outcomes of these popular uprisings based solely on state attributes, we would be wrong more often than we would be right. In these cases, despite their many commonalities, we observe enormous variation in outcome.

Although it has touched all corners of the globe and has had a major impact on nearly all Middle Eastern and North African states, the Arab Spring has had particularly strong impacts on Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, and Libya. From these six states the world has witnessed domestic unrest, violent government repression, regime transitions, civil war, and foreign military intervention. However, not all of these states have encountered each outcome.

Egypt, and Libya both experienced regime transitions while Syria has not. Syria and Libya both experienced civil wars, with Libya's resulting in foreign military intervention and Syria's is, as of this writing, ongoing. Tunisia and Yemen saw longtime strongmen and presidents removed from office and Yemen has seen a considerably clandestine intervention on the part of the United States in the name of the War on Terror. Bahrain received external assistance from the Peninsula Shield Force, the military-arm of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Other less-involved states, such as Jordan and Morocco, experienced protests that resulted in limitations on executive power.

Naturally, no two cases are perfectly identical, as Anderson (2011) points out with respect to the Arab Spring when comparing Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. In Tunisia, Anderson points to labor concerns, predominantly with youth unemployment. For Egypt, it was "the government's deteriorating ability to provide basic services and seeming indifference to widespread unemployment and poverty" (p. 4). For Libya, protests quickly fueled a civil war as the result of Qaddafi's patronage-based style of rule. Specifically, he kept his friends and family in power at the expense of others, and it was the others who revolted.

One could argue that the observed similarities among the Arab States are not strong enough to generalize across cases. Furthermore, some of the differing monadic attributes (youth unemployment, patronage, lack of public services, etc.) may be causal of the divergent outcomes. I find these explanations to be unconvincing for a few reasons. First, some of these explanations seem more anecdotal and post hoc than empirically true. For example, are we to believe that public services in Egypt are poor enough to warrant a popular uprising but public services in Libya or Yemen are not? Jordan and Morocco are monarchies and as such their entire system of government is built on patronage and familial ties—but Libya is the place where civil war resulted from such ties? Second, regardless of the rallying cry of the protesters, their goals were quite similar: they desired dictators to be restricted or removed from power and a stronger voice in government. Similarly, the cause of the uprising itself, whatever it may be, is not necessarily causal of the outcome.

More satisfying explanations of the outcomes of these cases are found when studying the network of cooperative relationships that these states possess. Military integration is strategic and effects state behavior. Because it is strategic, states do not cooperate with everyone and they certainly do not achieve a similar depth of cooperation with all partners. Brief anecdotes serve to highlight the point, paying particular attention to acts of government repression.⁶

Bahrain

Bahrain is a small state ruled by a minority ethnicity. The Sunnis, who govern the state, also populate the military. When the people began protesting the monarchy in Bahrain, the government moved quickly and silently to quiet their voices (Colombo, 2012). Simultaneously, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) threw its support behind the ruling family, the Khalifa's. The GCC, which consists of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, is a regional organization with a multinational military unit known as the Peninsula Shield Force. This military arm is comprised of troops from the GCC's member-states and, until its deployment in Bahrain, has never been used for the purposes of countering an internal threat (Colombo, 2012). The Peninsula Shield Force was deployed to Bahrain in March of 2011, about one month after the protests began, to assist with domestic security.

With the support of neighboring states and an additional security force on hand, Bahrain repressed its people through mostly non-violent means, including imprisonments, arrests, torture, and general intimidation tactics (Ulrichsen, 2012). While deplorable, these tactics results in few casualties and the deployment of large-scale violence has been avoided. Because the government and the military are of a minority ethnicity, Bahrain would have been a strong candidate for the use of lethal repression. However, by-and-large the state opted for a more restrained response.

Undoubtedly, the influence of the GCC was felt; had the Peninsula Shield Force not been available or had the government of Bahrain not been supported externally by the GCC, the Khalifa family may have felt increasingly threatened and turned to more violent methods for settling the unrest. Likely, the military would have supported the government due to its ethnic composition. Having the support of the GCC is itself a community effect on state behavior, but Bahrain also

⁶Any of the following anecdotes can be expanded into journal-length articles. My intent is simply to demonstrate some portion of the role that military cooperation had on the decision to repress. To keep these concise, many other important case-specific details have been omitted.

faced additionally external constraints on its actions. Specifically, the US Navy's Fifth Fleet is headquartered in Manama in Bahrain. This location brings benefits to the state of Bahrain by underwriting its security in addition to that of the entire Gulf Sea. It has been well documented in the press that the US acted to pressure Bahrain to use restraint in responding to protester demands.⁷ Some have even called for the US to consider shifting its headquarters to a more stable state or one where the government does not engage in repressive tactics, be they non-lethal or otherwise, of any sorts.⁸ However, the Fifth Fleet remains and Bahrain has continued to feel its constraining effects.

Libya

Around the same time that protests were developing in Bahrain, there were escalating tensions in Libya. In Libya, however, the government did not move quickly and quietly, nor did it make any obvious attempt to avoid using lethal repression tactics.⁹ No sooner had violence escalated than guns and money fled in to support the opposition, even though in the early stages nobody knew who that opposition was. As early as late February, 2011 (and probably earlier), arms were being supplied to the rebels by the United States through Egypt (Aghayev, 2013). By the end of February, the United Nations had already passed Resolution 1970, freezing Qaddafi's assets. On March 17, the UN passed UNSC Resolution 1973, establishing a no-fly zone and enabling external actors to intervene to protect the lives of Libyan citizens.

It took roughly one month from the start of the civil war to the point of foreign intervention. Although the civil war would continue until October, the outcome was clear by the end of March. The civil war in Libya lasted roughly eight months at the expense of about 25,000 lives lost and tens of thousands more injured. Qaddafi responded differently than the Khalifas, but Qaddafi was also embedded in a different structural situation: rather than a community of states supporting the regime and another one pressing for restraint, Qaddafi had a community of states supporting the rebels. The Libyan security forces had no strong military relationships, it could not depend

⁷ *The Guardian* "Bahrain Protests a Worry for US and its Fifth Fleet" by Mark Tran. 17 February 2011. Accessed 18 July 2013 at <http://goo.gl/tkHKm>.

⁸ *The Atlantic* "Time to Disband the Bahrain-based U.S. Fifth Fleet" by Toby C. Jones. 10 June 2011. Accessed 18 July 2013 at <http://goo.gl/h1YTB>

⁹ Wikipedia's "Timeline of the Libyan Civil War" lists several cases of overt government action that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of protesters during the latter half of February, 2011 (Wikipedia, 2013c).

on external assistance, and it had no benefactor to fall back on. Other communities recognized this and seized the opportunity. This includes the liberal democracies of Europe and the United States, but also the GCC itself whose members (notably Qatar) contributed to the intervention and vocally supported and aided the opposition (Colombo, 2012).

The Libyan military did use lethal repression, or at least those portions of the military that were loyal to the regime did. Others defected, eventually winning the ensuing civil war. With little integration that could be used as leverage for constraint, and little to lose through repression, the international repercussions faced by the military were minimal. The only factors that entered into their calculus was who is likely to win the conflict and their punishment for being on the wrong side. Restraining a military that is forced to make such a decision is a difficult enterprise, as the world learned again in the case of Syria.

Syria

Syria's civil war began in March of 2011, has lasted well over two years, and has come at a cost of nearly 100,000 dead and untold more injured (Wikipedia, 2013b). The United Nations, despite its condemnations, has been powerless to stop the violence. The Arab League, despite its suspension of Syria's membership, has been powerless to stop the violence. Western powers, who have slowly and somewhat discreetly been supplying the opposition with guns and money, have been powerless to stop the violence. In Libya, the international response to the government's lethal repression tactics had been swift and decisive, yet in Syria the response is slow and muffled.¹⁰

The difference? Syria has a strong friend in Russia (and a willing one in China) who is capable of paralyzing any multilateral effort through the United Nations. But Russia does not exist in isolation, rather it maintains a somewhat significant level of military integration with many former Soviet states and allies, including Iran, who directly supports Assad's regime. Through these channels, Syria has a security community to fall back on. It may not be of the same level of integration as that of the GCC, and so direct intervention in the name of peacekeeping might be unreasonable, but it may act to prevent the unanimous opposition to Assad or unanimous support for the rebels.

¹⁰Although events are continuing to unfold as of this writing, the differing Western response is seen every more clearly when chemical weapons entered the debate.

Like Qaddafi, the decision for Assad to use lethal repression was a simple one. The primary difference is that Assad's community supports repression while Qaddafi had no such community support one way or the other. The constraining effects of military integration can only be felt if the community is willing to leverage the cooperative structure. Otherwise, as in the case of Syria, it may have the adverse effect—the community can enable even the most inexcusable behaviors.

Egypt¹¹

Egypt's place in the Arab Spring is of central importance to outcome of the events as a whole (Ajami, 2012). The result of Egypt's ongoing unrest has been greatly influenced by its military ties to the United States and its looser but existing ties to European states such as France and Germany (Hashim, 2011; Nepstad, 2013). The Egyptian military has been on the receiving end of billions of dollars in military aid since Camp David and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979, and it does not wish to risk losing such benefits. Integrally linked to this aid is the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. If the peace treaty goes, then so does the military aid. It is in the interest of the Egyptian military not only to ensure it remains in good favor with the United States, but also to remain at peace with Israel.

When mass-protests struck in late January of 2011, it took on eighteen days until Hosni Mubarak, a dictator of thirty years, was removed from office (Holmes, 2012). With the exception of certain loyal elements, the military stood relatively idly by, firmly against Mubarak, especially once it became clear that the US wanted him gone from power. Although lethal repression did occur, the military ultimately did not act on behalf of Mubarak to violently repress the citizens of Egypt. Rather, for fear of hurting its relationship with the United States, the military eventually supported the overthrow of the existing regime in a coup d'etat (Powell and Thyne, 2011).

The costs to the Egyptian military for supporting a Mubarak regime that had lost the support of the United States were clear: a loss of military aid and increased isolation from the American community. Furthermore, the benefits for not supporting Mubarak were also clear: the military and all its relationships would persist, largely unchanged. When faced with these options, it is also clear which is more beneficial for the military as an institution.

All of the states discussed above – Bahrain, Libya, Syria, and Egypt – saw popular uprisings

¹¹Recent events may invalidate portions of this argument.

against dictators. All these states repressed the protests, in one way or another. However, the politicians of Libya and Syria were quick to order their militaries to open fire on the protesters and the military was quick to agree. This was not the case in Egypt and Bahrain. In Bahrain, the military acted in accordance with the government's wishes, but the government did not use widespread lethality. The Egyptian military, on the other hand, ultimately denied the government's request for repression and aided in the overthrow of the existing regime instead.

Each of these cases, as well as other behaviors associated with these events, are understood with respect to the level of military integration and with whom the states are cooperating with. Below, a preliminary empirical analysis of this theory is presented.

Measuring Integration and Theory Assessment

A network is defined as “a set of units and a rule that defines whether or in what way any two units are related to each other” (Maoz, 2006, p. 395). Here, the set of units, or actors, are states and their relationship is that of military cooperation. The network of relations is complex and comprised of several policies. By using these policies as indicators of the same underlying concept and combining them to reflect a single measure, relations are simplified to something more manageable. The framework put forth in Chapter Four serves as the unified framework adopted here.¹² Military cooperation is viewed through a multi-policy perspective with its theoretical roots in the alliance and foreign policy substitutability literatures.

Although network analysis has only recently been used as a methodology in IR (Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery, 2009; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2012; Maoz, 2006, 2010; Ward, Stovel and Sacks, 2011), it has a rather strong theoretical foundation that scholars have been, knowingly or not, constructing over a relatively long period of time. System polarity, for example, is a network concept. Foreign policy similarity, from its earliest computation, is a network-based measure. The system of alliances pertains to a network, as does international trade. States do not act independent of one another, but rather they act strategically, not just with respect to one

¹²Rather than focusing on the individual policy, military cooperation is viewed as a latent, underlying feature of a dyad that manifests itself in numerous observable ways. Each observable manifestation is referred to as an indicator of military cooperation. Comparable to how we measure conflict and regime-type, a set of justified indicators may be combined in some methodologically and theoretically appropriate way to yield a measure of the latent concept of interest. The five indicators are joint military exercises, arms transfers, multinational peacekeeping and combat operations, and formal alliances. The latent trait is estimated using a graded response model.

another but with respect to the system.

Measuring global military integration has to do with quantifying the total number and strength of military-cooperative relationships for a given state in a given year. In social network analysis, this is generally known as the concept of centrality. Numerous measures of centrality exist, so prior to deciding which is most accurately operationalizing the concept of military integration a brief review is beneficial.

Military cooperation has been operationalized as a non-directional relationship, and so the definitions of centrality that apply are also non-directional (the level of military cooperation from State A \rightarrow State B is the same as from State B \rightarrow State A). For some indicators of cooperation, such as arms transfers, this is a sub-optimal decision since it necessitates the loss of information. However, it suffices to provide a preliminary view a military cooperation within which to measure one's integration in a community.

One simple measure of a state's level of military integration is the sum of the number of its relationships. Since military cooperation is continuous (but bounded), the degree of military integration can be the sum of a state's estimated military cooperation with all other states in a given year. More formally, let $A = (a_{i,j})$ be the sociomatrix for a given year where $a_{i,j}$ equals the military cooperation between states i and j . For state i , degree centrality equals:

$$C_d^i = \sum_{j=1}^N a_{(i,j)} \quad \forall j \neq i \quad (1)$$

where N is the number of states in the system for a given year.

Calculating this measure for 2006 provides the rankings for the top and bottom twenty states shown in Table 1. Note that this measure is constructed globally and not based on one's integration to the Western liberal democracies. Many of the least integrated states are those that are extremely small, such as Monaco and Bhutan. Interestingly, several Cold War battleground states appear in the bottom twenty, including Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and Laos. The top twenty states also contain some surprises, with several Central and Southern American states breaking into the list, as well as the NATO partners that would be expected.

Also interesting to note in Table 1 is the high level of military integration of Turkey. In June of 2013, Turkey made headlines for the government's crackdown on peaceful protests. Depending on

with whom the military is cooperating, high levels as measured here would indicate the community influence on Turkey’s behavior should be quite high. That is, provided the high level of degree centrality is due to cooperation with Western liberal democracies (which, for Turkey, is certainly the case), we should expect the Turkish military to be constrained in its response to the protests.¹³

Table 1: Degree Centrality

Rank	State	Score	Rank	State	Score
183	Andorra	0	1	United States	272.09
183	Bhutan	0	2	Canada	225.55
183	Comoros	0	3	France	197.13
183	Cuba	0	4	Poland	192.06
183	Laos	0	5	Germany	185.79
183	Liechtenstein	0	6	Sweden	183.88
183	Malta	0	7	United Kingdom	178.34
183	Monaco	0	8	Turkey	175.37
183	San Marino	0	9	Denmark	173.56
183	Seychelles	0	10	El Salvador	170.72
183	Solomon Islands	0	11	Argentina	170.71
182	Maldives	1.077	12	Netherlands	168.94
181	Taiwan	1.111	13	Norway	168.76
180	Eritrea	1.524	14	Russia	165.68
179	Swaziland	1.524	15	Czech Republic	164.73
178	Vietnam	3.267	16	Brazil	164.65
177	Myanmar	3.708	17	Spain	162.77
176	North Korea	4.969	18	Uruguay	161.21
175	Kiribati	12.761	19	Bolivia	160.62
174	Marshall Islands	12.761	20	Belgium	158.5

One criticism of this measure of degree centrality is that it considers all actors equal. For example, Argentina’s military cooperation with the United States is treated identically to its military cooperation with Uruguay. Rather than assuming military cooperation is valued the same regardless of with whom one is cooperating, we may want to adjust the metric to reflect the importance of actors. One possibility for doing so is to use the centrality measure known as eigenvector centrality. This related concept of centrality increases the weight of actors that have strong connections to many other actors in the network and decreases the weight of actors that have weaker connections to others. More formally, let M_i equal the set of states that cooperate with i :

¹³By and large, this expectation has been supported. While repressive and, in some cases, lethal, the government’s response has not been to use widespread violence or lethality as in the cases of Syria or Libya.

$$C_e^i = \frac{1}{\lambda} \sum_{j \in M_i} x_j \quad (2)$$

where

$$x_j = \frac{1}{\lambda} \sum_{i=1}^N a_{i,j} x_i \quad (3)$$

The top and bottom twenty states based on eigenvector centrality for the entire system can be seen in Table 2. Many of the top states do not change order, however there are some notable exceptions. Russia drops from the top twenty, as does Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Bolivia. El Salvador ranks at number twenty. These states are replaced by other NATO states and Pakistan. The lowest twenty are quite similar, but again with a few notable exceptions. The Maldives and Eritrea are ranked last and next to last, which is surprising since these states registered *some* measure of degree centrality while other states registered none. North Korea drops out of the bottom twenty and improves to the twenty-sixth least integrated state. Outside of these states, there really is not much difference here due to the fact that most of these states have no military cooperation at all.

Other measures of centrality that may be used are closeness and betweenness centrality. Closeness centrality is an aggregate measure of the shortest paths from a state to all other states in the network. So, because the United States directly cooperates with many other states, its closeness centrality would be expected to rank quite high. Other states who cooperate with relatively few states, or who cooperate with a large but isolated set of states, would rank lower on this measure. Betweenness centrality has to do with measuring how often a state is passed through when calculating the shortest paths from one state to all other states in the network. For isolated states, there are a large number of others they are not connected with but could reach by passing through two or three others. Betweenness centrality measures how often a state is one of those “two or three others.”

Closeness and betweenness centrality are most useful concepts for measuring the importance of a nodes in a complex or large network. The network of states contains less than 200 nodes in a given year, and some of those states interact with nearly all others. The shortest path for any two states will rarely, if ever, be greater than two. The international system of military cooperation

Table 2: Eigenvector Centrality

Rank	State	Score	Rank	State	Score
193	Maldives	0.0042	1	United States	1
192	Eritrea	0.0043	2	Canada	0.8596
181	Comoros	0.0048	3	France	0.8001
181	Cuba	0.0048	4	Poland	0.7961
181	Laos	0.0048	5	Germany	0.7854
181	Liechtenstein	0.0048	6	United Kingdom	0.7556
181	Malta	0.0048	7	Denmark	0.7386
181	Monaco	0.0048	8	Turkey	0.7378
181	San Marino	0.0048	9	Sweden	0.7310
181	Seychelles	0.0048	10	Netherlands	0.7244
181	Solomon Islands	0.0048	11	Norway	0.7234
181	Bhutan	0.0048	12	Czech Republic	0.7084
181	Andorra	0.0048	13	Spain	0.6960
180	Swaziland	0.0062	14	Belgium	0.6872
179	Taiwan	0.0088	15	Greece	0.6649
178	Vietnam	0.0133	16	Italy	0.6523
177	Myanmar	0.0146	17	Pakistan	0.6320
174	Kiribati	0.0206	18	Finland	0.6315
174	Marshall Islands	0.0206	19	Romania	0.6312
174	Micronesia	0.0206	20	El Salvador	0.6176

is strongly dominated by NATO and other friends of the United States, and no other competing communities comes close to matching that level of integration. For these reasons, closeness and betweenness centrality are not used in further analysis.

Table 3: Integration With OECD States: 2006

State	Degree Centrality	Eigenvector Centrality
Syria	0	0.01
Libya	2.57	0.02
Bahrain	6.61	0.04
Egypt	28.76	0.23
Jordan	28.38	0.23
Morocco	26.46	0.22
Turkey	65.07	0.53
Yemen	22.48	0.18

For the purposes of measuring military integration to test the theory of government repression, the metrics of degree centrality and eigenvector centrality are used as they relate to a pre-defined community structure, namely that of Western liberal democracies. More specifically, rather than one's centrality in the entire network, as is shown in the Tables above, one's centrality to the set

of OECD states is calculated.¹⁴

The centrality measures for the Arab Spring states discussed above, as well as that of Jordan, Morocco, Turkey, and Yemen, are shown in Table 3. As would be expected, Turkey has the highest level of integration with OECD states, followed by Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, who each have similar levels of integration. Yemen is slightly less, followed by Bahrain, who ranks considerably low, and Syria and Libya, who register hardly any military integration with OECD states at all.

These measures provide some basic descriptive evidence for the theory as applied to the Arab Spring. The exceptions, possibly, are those of Yemen and Bahrain. Above, Bahrain's response to the protests are described as extremely repressive but shy of overt lethal action. Judging by their considerably low centrality score, we might not expect a state like Bahrain to feel the constraining effects of an integrated military. However, Bahrain's key source of integration, the location of the Fifth Fleet, is an indicator of military cooperation (overseas bases) that *is not* included because of data constraints.

The other notable exception is Yemen. For a small, poor state, Yemen has considerable levels of military cooperation with OECD states. In part, this is due to the expansion of the War on Terror into Yemen as early as 2002 with the United States' drone campaign (Hudson, Owens and Callen, 2012). The integration does not appear to have constrained Yemen's military, however, since the death toll since the start of Arab Spring-related protests has climbed to over 2,000 (Wikipedia, 2013a). Yemen's level of military cooperation may be a bi-product of foreign intervening interests rather than the target of sustained foreign policies, but it nonetheless provides one case-study through which we can observe behaviors that contradict what is expected.

Sustained Repression

Government repression may be of the sort described in the Arab Spring, where there is a specific event or set of events that the government is repressing, or it may be more sustained and institutionalized. For example, a state such as North Korea has institutionalized the repression of its

¹⁴Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic (1995), Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary (1996), Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea (1996), Luxembourg, Mexico (1994), Netherlands, New Zealand (1973), Norway, Poland (1996), Portugal, Slovakia (2000), Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. Note that Turkey is excluded because the extent of their democracy and norms against government repression are generally not thought to be institutionalized to the extent of the others listed. As it turns out, this is a very minor adjustment and does not result in any meaningful difference of interpretation.

people to the degree that the government never responds to public protests because such protests do not exist. Other states, such as Turkey, do not generally repress their citizens but may respond to particular campaigns or protests with repressive measures. The theory applies equally well to both situations, as the military or the security apparatus of the state is still the arm of government responsible for the repression.

To test the theory with respect to sustained repression, the Cingranelli-Richards Physical Integrity Index (Cingranelli and Richards, 1999) and the Political Terror Scale (Gibney, Cornett and Wood, 2010) are used as dependent variables. The Physical Integrity Index is an additive index that incorporates a set of indicators from the CIRI data – torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance – and ranges from 0 to 8 where 8 is complete respect and 0 is no respect for these rights. Although it fits well into the general concept of government repression, the index does not capture the concept of lethal repression. For example, Bahrain’s response to the protests of the Arab Spring would qualify as the highest levels of repression, even though they fall short of overt lethality. The Political Terror Scale, on the other hand, captures such elements.

The Political Terror Scale (PTS) ranges from 1 to 5, where 5 is the highest level of government repression and 1 is the lowest. The PTS has some important differences from the CIRI data (Wood and Gibney, 2010). Specifically, the PTS is not an additive index and so the methodological decisions about how to combine the indicators of political terror in a five point scale are more subjective than they are in the CIRI scheme. This is not to say they are worse, only that the PTS is not restricted by the assumptions of an additive index. While the highest scores of government repression may be achieved on the CIRI index without widespread violence undertaken by the state, the highest levels on the PTS are reserved for the large-scale repression of one’s population.

Figures 1 and 2 show the level of state repression on the x-axis and OECD integration on the y-axis.¹⁵ The red dots in the figures correspond to the mean level of integration for states that register the corresponding level of repression. Overall, as repression decreases there is a slight increase in military cooperation with OECD states. The strongest correlation is for states that score 7s and 8s on the CIRI scale and 1s on the PTS scale. Many of these states are, themselves, OECD states and so we should be careful not to glean too much from that correlation. Regardless,

¹⁵Note that the scales are reversed for CIRI and PTS. For CIRI, a 0 is the highest level of repression and for PTS a 5 is the highest level of repression.




Figure 1: OECD Integration and CIRI Index: 1981 – 2006

there is still a smaller, less pronounced trend for states that register higher levels of repression.

To examine the effect of OECD military integration on government repression more closely, four ordered logistic regressions are estimated. Following Davenport (2007), various institutional constraints that may affect a government’s ability to repress its citizens are controlled for. These include political constraints as a general construct and the presence of an independent judiciary (Henisz, 2000, 2002). To account for electoral constraints, Vanhanen’s measure of participation is used (Vanhanen, 2000). The natural log of population (Maddison, 2003) and GDP (World Development Indicators) are included, as is standard in models of government repression (Davenport and II, 2004). Since OECD states are not the ones of interest here, in particular because they are




Figure 2: OECD Integration and PTS Scale: 1981 – 2006

the states that act to constrain the others from repression, a dummy variable is included to account for OECD member states as well as a dummy variable to account for the systemic changes that arose at the end of the Cold War.

There is considerable missingness in the data, both from missing observations on the dependent variables and from missing observations on some of the included controls. This entails the assumption that these data are missing at random, which means that information from other variables can be used to accurately predict missing observations. This is opposed to missing completely at random, which means that whether or not an observation is missing is literally a random draw. As Honaker and King (2010) state, “MCAR would be appropriate if coin flips determined missingness,

whereas MAR would be better if missingness might also be related to other variables, such as mortality data not being available during wartime” (p. 564). The missingness here is certainly not completely random, as developed states and more current years have considerably fuller data than less-developed states in earlier years. Therefore, the data is imputed using the Amelia software in R.¹⁶ The estimates from each imputed dataset are combined using Rubin’s method as implemented in Amelia (Rubin, 1987; King et al., 2001).

Table 4: Sustained Repression Models: Ordered Logistics

	CIRI Phys Int	Political Terror	CIRI Phys Int	Political Terror
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Degree Centrality	0.009*** (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)		
Eigenvector Centrality			0.889*** (0.245)	-1.011*** (0.320)
Political Constraints	0.707*** (0.162)	-0.958*** (0.178)	0.724*** (0.161)	-0.920*** (0.178)
Independent Judiciary	0.960*** (0.081)	-1.244*** (0.085)	0.961*** (0.081)	-1.235*** (0.085)
Log Population	-0.558*** (0.034)	0.878*** (0.039)	-0.556*** (0.034)	0.879*** (0.039)
Log GDP	0.132*** (0.031)	-0.222*** (0.035)	0.129*** (0.031)	-0.211*** (0.035)
Participation	0.007*** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.002)
OECD State	2.079*** (0.127)	-2.243*** (0.147)	1.905*** (0.151)	-1.955*** (0.174)
CW Dummy	-0.426*** (0.065)	0.873*** (0.073)	-0.382*** (0.062)	0.863*** (0.069)
<i>Observations</i>	4,619	4,619	4,619	4,619

Notes: *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1

The results of the regressions using degree centrality and eigenvector centrality for both measures of repression are shown in Table 4. Across each model, the results support the theory. Specifically, both measures of centrality are positive and statistically significant when regressed on the CIRI Index, meaning that as one’s military integration with OECD states increases, it is less likely to use repression. For the Political Terror Scale, both measures are negative and statistically significant, which again has the same interpretation (recall that the scales move in opposite directions).

¹⁶More specifically, imputed using *Amelia.1.7* and *R version 2.15.2*

Responsive Repression

Lethal government repression often comes in the form of a government's response to a specific campaign, movement, or protest. The cases of the Arab Spring are good examples of such repression (or lack thereof). To more accurately model these instances, a selection model and the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcome (NAVCO) data are used (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Chenoweth and Lews, 2013). These data include 250 resistance campaigns against the government, 151 of which fall between the years 1981 and 2006 (Chenoweth and Lews, 2013).

Chenoweth and Lews (2013) code government repression targeting the resistance campaign on a scale from 0 to 3, with 0 corresponding to no repression and 3 corresponding to extreme repression. Two constructs of this repression measure as the dependent variables in the outcome stage of the selection model are used here. First is a dummy variable for extreme repression only and second is a dummy variable indicating whether any government repression is used at all. Of the 4,619 country-years in the data, 794 experience a campaign against the government. Of those, the government took extremely repressive action in 630 cases and some form of targeted repression in 731.¹⁷

The selection stage models the occurrence of a resistance campaign, and therefore variables considered to be associated with the causes of resistance movements and campaigns against the government are included. These include measures about the government as well as development indicators and causes for grievances. Specifically, political constraints on power, government effectiveness, and regime-types are used as controls for government and income inequality, population, GDP, and electricity consumption are used to control for causes of grievances within the population.

The outcome stage includes some factors that are known to affect government repression, as described above, plus attributes of the campaign movement itself. These include is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the campaign has created an army or military to support its goals (Chenoweth and Lews, 2013). If so, we should expect a government to respond with the highest overt military violence against the campaign. A variable has been coded to account for whether or not the goals of the campaign involve removal of the government in power or territorial sovereignty. Specifically, if the campaign desires regime change, territorial secession, or is an anti-occupation movement then the goals variable is coded as 1 and as 0 otherwise. Also included is the

¹⁷The NAVCO codebook does not go into much detail about how the measures of repression are constructed or what events fit into which category.

estimated size of the campaign, since larger campaigns might be viewed as more threatening than smaller ones. Moore (1998) discusses the effects of regime-type on government repression, and so regime-type variables, as measured by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2012), are included as controls.

Table 5: Responsive Repression Models: Outcome Equations

	Extm Repr (1)	Extrm Repr (2)	Any Repr (3)	Any Repr (4)
Intercept	-0.387 (0.552)	-0.302 (0.544)	0.552 (0.382)	0.653* (0.382)
Degree Centrality	-0.005*** (0.001)	— —	-0.001 (0.001)	— —
Eigenvector Centrality	— —	-0.358*** (0.132)	— —	0.01 (0.104)
Political Constraints	-0.061 (0.111)	-0.066 (0.11)	0.116 (0.078)	0.115 (0.077)
Independent Judiciary	-0.069* (0.041)	-0.079* (0.041)	0.008 (0.033)	-0.002 (0.033)
Participation	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)
Log Population	0.068 (0.048)	0.063 (0.047)	-0.008 (0.033)	-0.013 (0.033)
Log GDP	0.004 (0.016)	0.003 (0.015)	0.012 (0.013)	0.01 (0.013)
OECD State	-0.434*** (0.068)	-0.368*** (0.082)	-0.155*** (0.052)	-0.178*** (0.064)
Army	0.428*** (0.047)	0.429 *** (0.047)	0.179*** (0.039)	0.179*** (0.039)
Goals	0.188*** (0.031)	0.186*** (0.031)	0.053** (0.025)	0.052** (0.025)
Campaign Size	-0.04*** (0.013)	-0.041*** (0.013)	-0.013 (0.011)	-0.012 (0.011)
GWF–Party	-0.012 (0.042)	-0.004 (0.042)	0.041 (0.032)	0.053 (0.033)
GWF–Personal	0.035 (0.039)	0.035 (0.039)	0.064** (0.03)	0.067** (0.031)
GWF–Military	0.066 (0.085)	0.068 (0.083)	0.041 (0.061)	0.041 (0.061)
GWF–Monarchy	0.093 (0.093)	0.092 (0.093)	0.095 (0.075)	0.093 (0.074)
<i>Outcome Observations</i>	794	794	794	794

Notes: *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1

The results of the outcome stages are shown in Table 5.¹⁸ Generally, these results support the hypothesis that increased integration with OECD states decreases the likelihood of a state responding with repressive force to campaigns and protest movements. Both degree centrality

¹⁸Table 6 in the Appendix shows the results from the selection equation. Because the selection equation does not vary, these results are the same across all four models. Furthermore the outcome equation is primarily what is of interest for the purposes here.

and eigenvector have a statistically significant and negative effect on **extreme repression**. However, confidence in this result drops for **any repression**, although the coefficient is in the correct direction.

What this reveals about constraining effects of military integration with Western liberal democracies is perhaps best highlighted by the case of Bahrain during the Arab Spring. Or, perhaps even with the cases of Turkey and Egypt. All these states used repressive measures in response to the popular uprisings. However, none resorted to the use of widespread overt lethality, as did Syria and Libya. More generally, the findings in Table 5 suggest that integration with Western states does not inhibit repression, but it does inhibit lethal repression.

Other variables that are significantly associated with repression include the presence of an army and the stated goals of the movement. Specifically, as expected, if the movement raises an army or declares goals that threaten the existence of the state or its territorial sovereignty, the government is more likely to respond with repressive measures. Of course, the effect is endogenous: if a campaign raises an army or threatens a state's sovereignty, the state will move to repress those actions.

The only regime-type variable that is statistically significant is personal regimes, and here there appears to be a positive relationship between this variable and **any repression**, but not with **extreme repression**. The OECD dummy is something of a regime-type variable for democracies, although it is not representative of all democracies in the system. OECD is statistically significant and negative, as would be expected in the case of government repression.

Endogeneity is a particular concern for many of the variables in models of government repression, including the primary explanatory variables examined here. For example, OECD states may increase support to a state that is threatened by a resistance movement precisely because it is threatened by a resistance movement. This is the concept of herding that is briefly discussed above. External states may offer increased integration in return for pledges to not use overt lethality against the movement, which would generally support the theory, but that decision-making process is not directly modeled here. That is, the models do not represent the strategic decision to increase cooperation in the face of domestic resistance. One possibility for addressing endogeneity in these models is to use the instrumental variables approach, as is done by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) in a similar context.

Conclusion

Understanding state behavior is a fundamental undertaking in the study of international relations. Domestic structures affect state behavior, as does membership in various international organizations. Alliances affect state behavior. Military cooperation, too, affects state behavior.

Military cooperation is differentiated from these other affects on behavior because it pertains directly to the autonomy of the state military and to the linking of security concerns across states. As military cooperation increases, states continue to take responsibility for the security of others. As they do so, communities of military cooperation develop and one's integration into such communities has its own distinguishable effects on state behavior. Foreign policy transmission is one example of a behavior enable by an integrated security community.

As states increase their levels of military cooperation, the community that forms increasingly becomes a single entity whose behavior is distinct from other entities. Two examples of behavior discussed are poaching and herding, but potentially many others exist. Community behavior is related to the linked security concerns of the community's constituent members. Future research should explore these security links in more detail and, specifically, their influences on community behavior.

In this paper, the behavior of government repression is examined in some detail. Specifically, it is argued that states that are integrated with Western liberal democracies, who have strong norms against the use of lethal government repression, are less likely to use such forms of repression against their citizens. The cases of Bahrain, Libya, Syria, and Egypt during the Arab Spring generally support the theory, although Bahrain may present some challenges and the case of Yemen, which is not explored in much detail, presents a rather strong counter-example.

Using the social network measures of degree centrality and eigenvector centrality and various measures of government repression, this theory is tested on all states from 1981 – 2006. The empirical evidence generally supports the theory that states that are integrated with the OECD are less likely to use repression against their citizens, thus demonstrating the constraining effects. These models are quite preliminary and future work is needed to more accurately model the effects of military integration on government repression.

Appendix

Table 6: Responsive Regression Models: Sample Equation

NAVCO Regression	
(1)	
SELECTION EQUATION	
Intercept	-3.735*** (0.673)
Political Constraints	-0.856*** (0.173)
Government Effectiveness	-0.012 (0.08)
Income Inequality	0.006 (0.004)
Log Population	0.357*** (0.043)
Log GDP	-0.017 (0.04)
Electricity Consumption	0.000*** (0.000)
GWF-Party	-0.209*** (0.076)
GWF-Personal	0.063 (0.089)
GWF-Military	0.654*** (0.102)
GWF-Monarchy	-0.38** (0.161)
<i>Selection Observations</i>	4,619
<i>Notes:</i>	*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1

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