Constraining Cooperation:
Military Relations and Government Repression

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Sometimes states repress political campaigns harshly, and sometimes they do not. Why? I argue that military cooperation with liberal democracies constrains the state from using severe forms of repression against opposition campaigns. Liberal democracies face costs for human rights violations by their friends, and are likely to coerce the military from repressive actions. Such interconnectedness also socializes the military with democratic militaries that have strong norms against the use of widespread and excessive repression. However, the military is not the only repressing agency, and therefore this constraint does not act to prevent repression but rather to limit its severity. This theory is tested using the NAVCO data and a new, latent measure of military cooperation. I find that military cooperation with liberal democracies does not prevent the state from repressing opposition movements, but it does limit the severity. This finding provides evidence of one benefit to expanding multinational security cooperation initiatives involving liberal democracies.

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1 Introduction

Political campaigns are “a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective” (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013, p 416). Sometimes states use widespread and excessive force to repress political campaigns, and sometimes they do not. This decision to use force influences, and in many cases determines, whether the campaign will be a catalyst for reform and democratization or instability and civil war.

For example, Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004, and Egypt’s Movement for Change (Kefeya) in 2004 and 2005 are three political campaigns that involved an opposition movement taking to the streets in protest of the regime. In each of these instances, the government did not use military force, or extreme forms of repression in general, to disband or attempt to disband the campaign. None escalated to civil war, and in Georgia the campaign led directly to democratization (Mitchell 2006).

In Tajikistan in 1992, and in Libya and Syria in 2011, campaigns began much the same way—people taking to the streets in opposition to the regime. However, in each of these instances the government took relatively swift action involving the military to disband the campaign. All three resulted in civil war.

Why did Tajikistan, Libya, and Syria choose widespread repression while Georgia, Ukraine, and Egypt did not? Generally, what influences the state to use widespread and excessive force to repress political campaigns, and what constrains it from doing so? Following previous work in civil-military relations, I assume a principal-agent relationship where the state’s response is the result of decisions and strategic interactions between the leader and the military (Finer 1976; Feaver 1998). Internal threats weaken the leader’s control over the military, incentivizing the military to act on behalf of its preferences (Desch 1999; Huntington 1962). Political campaigns represent such a threat. Assuming either explicit or implicit consent from the military is required for widespread repression, the question then becomes which factors push the military toward repression and which constrain?

I argue that the military’s preferences are strongly influenced by its integration into the community of liberal democracies. Liberal democracies face costs for human rights violations by their friends, so during political campaigns they leverage these relationships in an effort to constrain repression. Liberal democracies also have strong norms against the use of severe
repression and professional militaries that adhere to these norms, so interactions with their community socializes states and transfers norms that inhibit and dissuade actors from using military force to repress. However, the military is not the only repressing agency in the state. Others exist, and agency loss and external constraints may not be present to the degree we expect with the military. As a result, military integration with liberal democracies does not prevent repression, but rather limits its severity.

The theory is expanded below and tested using the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes data. Military integration is operationalized by first constructing a new, latent estimate of dyadic military cooperation and then using that estimate to build scores that represent military integration into the community of liberal democracies. I find that military integration with liberal democracies constrains severe repression, but it does not prevent lesser forms of repression. This finding provides evidence of one benefit to expanding multinational security cooperation initiatives involving liberal democracies.

2 Theory

Following Feaver (1998), I view the relationship between the civilian leadership and the military as one of principal and agent. In the presence of a political campaign, these two self-interested actors are responsible for the severity of state repression. Agency loss is a concept used to specify the degree to which the agent (military) obliges the requests of the principal (leader). With no agency loss, the military would dutifully act on the requests of the leadership. As agency loss increases, the military is more likely to act on behalf of its preferences, which may or may not align with those of the leader. Political campaigns create agency loss.

Scholars of civil-military relations have long-noted that during times of heightened internal threats, civilian control over the military is weakened (Desch 1999; Huntington 1962). Such threats can cause the military to question the legitimacy of the state government, and thus disrupt the foundation on which the notion of civilian control is built (Finer 1976; Huntington 1957) calls attention to this point when he asks, “What is the responsibility of the officer when he is ordered to do something which is … [a] clear transgression of commonly accepted standards of morality?” (p 77). Finer (1976) goes further when discussing the potential causes of military intervention into politics when he states, “The professional army sees itself as the
nation’s custodian against foreign foes; the foreigner is the enemy, not a fellow national . . . The strain which such duties put on the loyalty of the armed forces is often too great and impels them to disobey” (p 23-24).

Political campaigns heighten internal pressures, creating agency loss. With a weakened element of civilian control, the military is more likely to act on its preferences irrespective of those of the leader. Assuming either explicit or implicit consent from the military is required for the state to repress any campaign severely, the question then becomes, what influences the military’s preferences toward repression?

I argue that military cooperation with liberal democracies imposes external constraints on the severity of repression. Liberal democracies are defined as those with both “political liberties and democratic rule... Political liberties exist to the extent that the people of a country have the freedom to express a variety of political opinions in any media and the freedom to form or to participate in any political group. Democratic rule exists to the extent that the national government is accountable to the general population, and each individual is entitled to participate in the government directly or through representatives” (Bollen 1993, p 1208-1209). Military cooperation with liberal democracies imposes external constraints for two reasons. One, liberal democracies face high costs for human rights violations, not just within their borders but by their friends (Davenport and Armstrong 2004). Furthermore, liberal democracies are more sensitive to these costs than other regimes, as much of the literature on “shaming” assumes (DeMeritt 2012, Lebovic and Voeten 2009). Following this reasoning, the military’s liberal democratic partners should be expected to leverage their relationship to influence the cost-benefit calculus for repressing.

Two, liberal democracies have strong norms against the use of military force on one’s domestic population and in support of the right to assemble and protest. Diffusion theory suggests that these norms would flow to the integrating states by processes of socialization (Atkinson 2006, Greenhill 2010). Following this reasoning, military integration with liberal democracies again serves as a constraint on the severity of repression.

I argue that military integration constrains the severity of repression, but does not prevent repression. Specifically, repression is not the sole domain of the military. In fact, it is often the case that the leadership has other agencies that are responsible for managing internal dissent.
prior or in conjunction with the involvement of the military. Even with agency loss and a military whose preferences are against repression, these alternative agencies make it possible for the leader to repress. However, with a constrained military, the leader’s ability to repress is limited.

There is also the possibility that the military and the leader have linked fates, as would happen in a military dictatorship. In such a situation, political campaigns do not create agency loss. The military and the leader suffer the same costs and see the same benefits. If the political campaign has threatening objectives, the threat pertains to both. In cases of linked fates, military integration with liberal democracies is not expected to have an effect on the severity of repression.

2.1 Coercion and Liberal Democracies

Liberal democracies faces costs for human rights violations by their friends (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004). They are also more sensitive to these costs than other regimes, as much of the literature on “shaming” assumes (DeMeritt, 2012; Lebovic and Voeten, 2009). To not suffer these costs, liberal democratic partners may leverage existing relationships, and the potential for future relationships, to prevent or dampen repression.

Weapons and weapons technology transfers are one example of a relationship that a liberal democracy could be expected to leverage. These transfers enhance the strength of the military, generally involve long-term maintenance contracts, and are a good predictor of future weapons and technology deals. Liberal democracies face a high cost for providing weapons to states that commit human rights violations, and perhaps an amplified cost if the recipient commits those violations using those very same weapons. This is not to say that liberal democracies do not provide weapons to repressive states—they do (Toombs and Smith, 2012). However, the existence of this relationship creates a channel with the military that liberal democracies can leverage to avoid or limit the costs associated with providing weapons to repressive states. For example, following the 2005 killing of political protesters in Ethiopia using American sold Humvees, the United States announced that it would no longer sell Humvees to Ethiopia (IRIN, 2006). Such an act is a deterrent to states in positions similar to that of Ethiopia.

The military may also be influenced to not repress through external guarantees that the
institution of the military will survive the political campaign, even if the leader does not. For example, the liberal democratic partner can offer promises to deter additional threats to stability. This is a substantiated worry when confronted with opposition campaigns since political instability and civil wars have been shown to cluster in time and space (Gleditsch and Ward, 2006; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Maves and Braithwaite, 2013). The additional stability provided by an external actor can serve to allay the fears of the military and convince them that their survival is not at stake. This is not the case for the leader when the political campaign is the direct threat.

In some cases, security partners can guarantee additional material and reputational benefits to the military if it shows constraint. In such instances, the promise of further military integration is a reward for constraint. For example, during the Cold War membership in NATO was used as a means for constraining the militaries of southern Europe and Turkey from taking action that threatened democracy in those states (Pridham, 1991).

Hypothesis 1: Military cooperation with liberal democracies that creates material benefits for the military will lessen the severity of repression on the political campaign.

2.2 Socialization and Liberal Democracies

While coercion and external guarantees may be influential during times of political campaigns, these are not the only moments during which military cooperation with liberal democracies influences the preferences of the military. Knowingly or not, states that cooperate on a regular basis see socialization effects. Constructivist theorists have made substantial theoretical progress with respect to socialization, both through general international institutions (Ruggie, 1998; Checkel, 2005; Goodman and Jinks, 2013) and through military relationships (Atkinson, 2006, 2010).

Socialization effects influence the preferences of the military via diffusion of norms of military behavior (Adler, 2008; Atkinson, 2006, 2010). If liberal democracies possess strong norms with respect to the appropriate military response to political campaigns, then these attributes may be transmitted through cooperative-security policies that encourage socialization, including international military education, joint military exercises, and multinational peacekeeping operations.

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1 The constraint in this example refers to preventing a military coup. However, the promise of additional benefits could be leveraged in the same way to prevent repressive actions.
Indeed, these types of military cooperation are sometimes intended to create precisely such an influence, and this effect has been observed. For example, by the end of the Cold War, “most of Turkey’s high-ranking officers have either visited or served in various NATO headquarters and the United States. Such experiences abroad have given them an international outlook and contributed to their sense of professionalism... their commitment to maintaining their country’s ties with the West prevent them from overlooking Western views on the regime problems in Turkey” (Karaosmanoğlu, 1991, p. 170–171). Similar socialization effects have also been observed in Spain, Portugal, and other NATO states (Pridham, 1991).

Risse and Sikkink (1999) identify two processes of socialization, either of which may transmit the norm of military constraint. One is “moral consciousness-raising, argumentation, dialogue, and persuasion,” and the other is “institutionalization and habitualization” (p. 5). With respect to the former, these include interactions during the time of the political campaign, when the military may be engaging in discussions with external actors about their course of action. In such situations, it is likely that liberal democracies would advise restraint, as they themselves possess strong norms against the use of domestic force and suffer consequences when their security partners deploy such force.

The latter form of socialization is more directly related to communities of practice (Adler, 2008; Wenger, 1998). Broadly, “communities of practice are groups of people who share a concern or a passion for something they do and learn how to do it better as they interact regularly” (Wenger, 2011). Within such a community, certain patterns of behavior become commonplace and are expected to occur. States that actively engage in various forms of military cooperation are an example of a community of practice. Through repeated interactions, elites become accustomed to specific behaviors and adopt certain principles, such as the appropriate deployment of force.

In socializing with liberal democracies, states observe their behaviors and naturally begin to imitate them and engage in similar types of behavior. This extends beyond the habit of a peaceful response to political campaigns, and includes making a habit out of the cooperative interactions themselves. For example, states may become accustomed to contributing to United Nations peacekeeping operations, as in Bangladesh, where service to UN peacekeeping operations is a source of pride for the military and one mechanism by which the military enhances its
global image ([Krishnasamy, 2003]). The use of widespread and excessive repression against a political campaign may influence the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, the three permanent members of the UN’s Security Council that are liberal democracies, to refuse to allow Bangladesh to continue participating in such operations. Thus, the severity of the repression is not a decision made in isolation. Rather, it is linked to other cooperative interactions that the military has become accustomed to and sees direct benefits from.

**Hypothesis 2: Military cooperation with liberal democracies that creates socialization effects will lessen the severity of repression on the political campaign.**

### 2.3 Repressing Agencies

Thus far, I have argued that political campaigns create agency loss between the leader and the military, and that the military is influenced by external constraints imposed by its relationship to liberal democracies. The leader, however, is not powerless to repress without the military. Other agencies have the tools and authority to repress, and these agencies may exist entirely outside of the military chain of command. They may also be “closer” to the leader, for example by being staffed with the leader’s kin.

For example, following the onset of domestic unrest, in early 1992 the government of Tajikistan formed a Presidential Guard for the specific purpose of managing the dissent and protecting the regime ([Akbarzadeh, 1996]). This type of agency is not unique to Tajikistan; nearly every state has some type of federal agency, outside of the military’s direct chain of command, that could be used for such purposes. In fact, one way that the civilian leadership maintains effective control over security forces is to create multiple agencies and branches tasked with specialized roles ([Feaver, 1999]). Overall, the existence of such agencies suggests that, even in the presence of agency loss and a military opposed to repression, the government has some ability to repress. With the military’s consent or assistance, however, the repression will not be as severe.

**Hypothesis 3: Military cooperation with liberal democracies will not prevent the use of repression.**
2.4 Linked Fates

It is important to consider the effects of military cooperation with liberal democracies when the leader and the military have *linked fates*. In such situations, these two sub-state actors have the same costs and see the same benefits to repression. By definition, the military cannot survive a leadership change, and threats to the leader are equally as threatening to the military. This is the case in a military dictatorship, for example, where an officer or group of officers effectively control government (Geddes, Frantz and Wright, 2014). In other types of regimes, we might observe a situation of linked fates when the military elites are drawn disproportionately from the leader’s family, and the officers from the leader’s ethnicity. There is no agency loss in the presence of a political campaign when the leader and the military have linked fates.

The lack of agency loss creates a situation where the external constraints may be present, but would not affect repression since the political campaign is now directly threatening to both the military and the leader. It is commonly assumed that elites wish to remain in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Ritter, 2014). The military elites are no exception. Should the political campaign threaten the military, or its source of power, repression becomes more likely.

Unless the military and the leader have linked fates, it is generally not the case that the military is a target of campaign movement. For example, in the cases of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and Georgia’s Rose Revolution, the political leadership was targeted and not the military (Fairbanks, 2004; Karatnycky, 2005). As opposed to being the target of a campaign, military support is actually beneficial and often sought by the opposition. For example, in democratic opposition movements, Sharp recommends, “Troops should learn that the struggle will be of a special character, designed to undermine the dictatorship but not to threaten their lives” (Sharp, 2008, p 63). Barany is more explicit: “The support of the armed forces is a necessary condition for a revolution to succeed” (Barany, 2011, p 24).

If the military and the leader have linked fates, the constraints resulting from military cooperation with liberal democracies will be subsumed by the desire to remain in power.

*Hypothesis 4: Military cooperation with liberal democracies will have no effect on the severity of repression when the leader and the military have linked fates.*
3 Research Design

Conditional on states experiencing a political campaign, military integration with liberal democracies is expected to decrease the likelihood that the state uses widespread and excessive repression. To test this, a selection model is used to alleviate concerns about bias that may be introduced because states that experience a political campaign may be systematically different from states that do not (Heckman 1979; Sartori 2003). In the selection equation, the dependent variable, a political campaign, is operationalized using the Nonviolent and Violent Campaign and Outcomes (NAVCO) data. In the outcome equations, the dependent variable is coded from the repress variable in the NAVCO data, and represents either any repression or severe repression, depending on the model.

The key explanatory variable, military integration, is operationalized in a two-step process. First, dyadic military cooperation is estimated using a graded response model and combining five indicators of military cooperation: arms transfers, formal alliances, joint military exercises, and multinational peacekeeping and combat operations. Second, the set of liberal democracies is operationalized as states that are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and military integration is measured by taking the sum of a state’s dyadic military cooperation with all OECD states. As a robustness check another measure of military integration is produced by again summing across dyadic military cooperation with OECD states, but this time also weighting by the OECD states relationship to other OECD states (e.g., the weight of the United States would increase while that of Ireland would decrease). The data in this study range from 1981 through 2006, and missing observations have been multiply imputed using the Amelia software package (Honaker et al. 2011; Honaker and King 2010).

3.1 Dependent Variables and Selection Model

The NAVCO data are used to identify political campaigns and measure the degree of repression (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). These data include 151 unique resistance campaigns consisting of 794 country-years between 1981 and 2006 (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). To assess the theory, a selection model is used where the selection stage models the occurrence of a resistance campaign in a country-year and the outcome stage models the state’s degree of repression.
A selection model is of consideration when the outcome of interest only exists for a sample of the population. In this instance, the degree of repression is only available in the sample of country-years that experience a political campaign. We may ignore sample selection under two general conditions: if the sample is random or if we have a sample that cannot be predicted by any unmeasured variables (Sartori, 2003). In this case, there are reasons to expect the sample is not random. For example, ethnically heterogenous states are more likely to have internal divisions and an ethnic identity facilitates organization (Denny and Walter, 2014). With respect to the latter, these internal tensions may be latent and difficult to observe until triggered by some type of shock, resulting in a political campaign. For these reasons, a selection model is one appropriate technique for modeling these data. For robustness, models are also estimated using only the sample of country-years that experience a political campaign.

The selection stage models the occurrence of a political campaign. Of the 4,619 country-years in the data, 794 experience a campaign against the government. Many reasons for political opposition movements have been theorized (Gurr, 2011; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Meyer, 2004). In the selection stage, I include political constraints, government effectiveness, the presence of banned political parties, ethnic fractionalization, and an autocracy indicator as measures of poor governance and representation. I also include income inequality, population, GDP, and electricity consumption as measures of living conditions.

The outcome stage models the severity of repression. Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) code government repression targeting the resistance campaign on a scale from 0 to 3, with 0 corresponding to “no repression” and 3 corresponding to “extreme repression.” Of the 794 country-years experiencing a political campaign, the government took extremely repressive action in 630 cases and some form of targeted repression in 731. In the empirical models, I use either a dichotomous variable for extreme repression or a dichotomous variable indicating whether any government repression is used.

Institutional constraints are measured using the Political Constraints Index III (Henisz, 2013). The government effectiveness variable is from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2014). The banned parties variable is from the Institutions and Elections Project (Regan, Frank and Clark, 2009). The ethnic fractionalization variable is from Alesina et al. (2003). Autocracy is coded from the Autocratic Regimes data (Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2012). GDP, energy per capita, and income inequality, which is measured using the GINI index, is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2015). Population is from the Maddison Project (The Maddison-Project, 2013). All data has been made available through the Quality of Government project (Teorell et al., 2016).
3.2 Independent Variable: Measuring Military Integration

The primary independent variable of interest is military integration with liberal democracies. We cannot use any single foreign policy to measure military integration without sacrificing a great deal of measurement validity. Foreign policies are known to be substitutable, meaning states typically have more than one policy option for achieving a desired outcome (Most and Starr 1984; Palmer and Morgan 2006). The decision of which policy to adopt is often context dependent (Clark and Reed 2005; Morgan 2000). Cooperative policies that integrate militaries are no exception to this rule. For example, scholars have stressed the importance of an alliance’s formal and informal, and institutional and behavioral characteristics (Walt 1987). They have noted that friendly states do not always choose to adopt a formal alliance, while less-friendly ones may choose to do so for a variety of reasons (Morrow 2000). For these reasons, I do not rely on a single indicator of military cooperation, such as a formal alliance. Instead, multiple indicators are combined to estimate military cooperation as a latent trait of a dyadic relationship. Then, military integration with liberal democracies is measured by summing a state’s military cooperation with OECD states.

3.2.1 Defining Cooperative Policies

Policies of military cooperation are defined as those that are jointly adopted by two or more states for the purposes of either (1) reducing one or more excluded state’s military power, (2) enhancing the military power of at least one state, or (3) coordinating military activity for the benefit of some state or set of states. The policy must deliberately involve a military in some capacity, and it may be either institutional or behavioral.

The indicators that are included in this measure are formal alliances, arms transfers, joint military exercises, and multinational combat and peacekeeping operations. These five indicators are combined using a graded response model (GRM) from item response theory (IRT) (Baker and Kim 2004; Samejima 1997).

Note 3: Data on joint military exercises has been collected as part of the author’s dissertation. The alliance data comes from the Correlates of War project (Gibler and Sarkees 2004; Gibler 2009). Data on arms transfers is made available by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Multinational combat operations has been constructed using PRIO’s armed conflict data. The peacekeeping data have been coded from the set of peacekeeping operations that have been labeled by Mark Mullenbach as part of the Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management project.
3.2.2 Operationalizing Military Cooperation

Formally, each dyad-year is indexed by $i = 1,...,n$. The indicators of military cooperation are represented by $j = 1,...,m$ and the set of ordinal responses for each $j$ is given by $k = 1,...,K_j$. The following model is estimated using the \texttt{grm} function in the \texttt{ltm} package in R (Rizopoulos, 2006).

\[
P(y_{ij} = k|x_i) = g(\eta_{jk}) - g(\eta_{j,k+1}),
\]
\[
\eta_{jk} = \alpha_j(x_i - \beta_{jk}), \quad k = 1,...,K_j,
\]
\[
g(z) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-z}}.
\]

In the above model, we are interested in the probability of the $i$th dyad-year to reach the $k$th “level” of military cooperation for the $j$th indicator ($y_{ij}$), given the estimated latent level of military cooperation for the dyad-year ($x_i$). $\beta_{jk}$ is the extremity parameter and $\alpha_j$ is the discrimination parameter.

Treier and Jackman (2008) use a similar method for calculating a regime-type measure using the Polity indicators, and Benson and Clinton (2012) use an application of item response theory to measure the strength of an alliance across two dimensions: the power of the individual states that are party to the agreement and the terms of the agreement itself.

3.2.3 Measuring Integration

The theory purports that the constraining effects on campaign repression are expressed through one’s aggregate military integration with liberal democracies. What has been estimated with the GRM is a dyadic measure of military cooperation. To measure military integration, the network concept of \textit{centrality} is used. Centrality is a measure of an actor’s importance to a network, as judged by its relationships with other actors (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). For the purposes of measuring military integration, the centrality metrics are calculated for the network of liberal democracies, since that is the network of states for which we are assessing one’s importance. Here, liberal democracies are operationalized as the set of OECD states.\footnote{Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic (1995), Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary (1996), Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea (1996), Luxemourg, Mexico (1994), Netherlands, New}
While numerous types of centrality measures exist, degree and eigenvector centrality are the two that best capture the notion of military integration. Degree centrality is the sum of a state’s estimated military cooperation with all other states in a given year. States with high degree centrality, or those that have high levels of military cooperation with many liberal democracies, have more and deeper cooperative relationships that may be leveraged and will have been better socialized in the liberal democratic community. Formally, let $a_{i,j}$ equal the estimated military cooperation between states $i$ and $j$, and $N$ is the number of states in the system for a given year. For state $i$, degree centrality equals:

$$C^d_i = \sum_{j=1}^{N} a_{(i,j)} \quad \forall j \neq i$$

(2)

Eigenvector centrality is similar, but it increases the weight of relationships with actors that have strong connections to many other actors in the network and decreases the weight of actors that have weaker connections. The logic underlying this measure of the causal mechanism is that states will value their cooperative relationship with central states, such as the US, because such states have leverage over other states in the network by virtue of their centrality. That is, a state would not wish to upset the United States, not just because of their relationship, but because the United States can leverage its cooperative partners to decrease their cooperation with the offending state as well. Formally, let $M_i$ equal the set of states that cooperate with $i$:

$$C^e_i = \frac{1}{\lambda} \sum_{j \in M_i} x_j = \frac{1}{\lambda} \sum_{j=1}^{N} a_{i,j} x_j$$

(3)

Thus, two measures of military integration are produced. The first, built using degree centrality, sums a state’s latent estimate of military cooperation with all OECD states. The second, built using eigenvector centrality, weights the latent estimate of military cooperation based on the OECD state’s relationship with other OECD states.

Zealand (1973), Norway, Poland (1996), Portugal, Slovakia (2000), Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. Note that Turkey is excluded because the extent of their democracy and norms against government repression are generally not thought to be institutionalized to the extent of the others listed. This adjustment does not result in any meaningful difference of interpretation.
3.3 Linked Fates and Control Variables

To operationalize whether the military and leader have linked fates, I use the military dictatorship variable in Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2012). Admittedly, this is not sufficient to code all cases of linked fates. A better measure would more directly assess the ties between the leader and the military. However, due to a lack of data, the presence of a military dictatorship provides some traction for assessing Hypothesis 4. Military integration is interacted with military regime to test whether the effect of military integration is different for regimes with linked fates.

Campaign goals, the size of the campaign, and the presence of an army are used to control for the threat that the campaign poses (Gartner and Regan, 1996). These three variables are in the NAVCO data, and Campaign Goals is coded as a 1 if NAVCO codes the goal as regime change, territorial secession, or anti-occupation (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013). Moore (1998) discusses the effects of regime-type on government repression; this is accounted for with the OECD indicator for liberal democracy and with the military regime indicator. I control for the type of resistance because, as Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) note, nonviolent tactics may inhibit the use of overt repression because it provides the military with less legitimacy to repress. Resistance Method is coded as 1 if the campaign is coded by Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) as “primarily nonviolent.” An indicator for whether the state is in the OECD, and thus coded as a liberal democracy, is included. Finally, the log of GDP and the log of population are included as controls.

4 Empirical Models

While Hypotheses 1 and 2 clearly distinguish between military cooperation that creates opportunities for coercion and military cooperation that creates socialization effects, it is difficult to distinguish among these two causal mechanisms empirically. For example, joint military exercises are often held annually, and the threat of canceling such exercises could be a coercive mechanism. The same exercises also provide opportunities for socialization. Similar arguments can be made for the other indicators. As a result, Hypotheses 1 and 2 are assessed jointly using

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5Population is from the Maddison Project (The Maddison-Project, 2013). GDP is from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2015). Both are available through the Quality of Government (Teorell et al., 2016).
the described measure of military integration.

4.1 Primary Findings

The findings in Table 1 suggests that military integration with liberal democracies does not inhibit repression, but it does limit its severity. Both measures of military integration (Degree and Eigenvector), have a statistically significant and negative effect on severe repression. These variables have no statistically significant effect on any repression. This suggests that political campaigns in states with higher levels of military integration are being repressed, but that are not experiencing the severity of repression felt by political campaigns in states with lower levels of military integration. Recall that Hypotheses 1 and 2 state that military integration is expected to lessen the severity of repression, while Hypothesis 3 states that military integration will not prevent repression. Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 are therefore supported by the findings reported in Table 1.

Hypothesis 4, which states that military integration will have no effect on the severity of repression when the leader and military have linked fates, is not supported. Specifically, the interaction of military integration with military regime does not have a statistically significant effect, suggesting that the effect of military integration is not different for military regimes. Additionally, the military regime effect is not statistically significant in Models 1 through 4, suggesting that military regimes are not any more or less likely to use repression in the absence of military integration.

Resistance Method is found to have a negative effect on both severe repression and any repression. This suggests that political campaigns that use non-violent resistance methods are less likely to experience repression. This supports the assertion by Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) that non-violent resistance provides the military with less legitimacy to repress.

As expected, liberal democracies are also less likely to severely repress political campaigns within their states. However, the finding does not hold for any repression. This supports the notion found in the literature that repression is more costly for democratic states Davenport (2007).

\[\text{Table 4 in the Appendix shows the results from the selection equation. Because the selection equation does not vary, these estimates are the same across all four models. All selection models are estimated using the sampleSelection library in R (Toomet, Henningsen et al. 2008).}\]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Sevr Rep</th>
<th>Model 2 Sevr Rep</th>
<th>Model 3 Any Rep</th>
<th>Model 4 Any Rep</th>
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* $p < 0.05$

Table 1: Outcome Equation: Base Models
Campaign Size, Campaign Goals, and Army are variables meant to capture the threats that the campaign poses. While the size of the campaign is not influential, the effects on the two other are. Specifically, campaigns with goals that amount to a direct loss of power for the government elite are more likely to be repressed. Possessing an army does not influence whether the state represses, but it does make severe repression more likely.

An important consideration here is that military integration may be highly correlated with other forms of integration with liberal democracies, particularly economic and political. If these variables are highly correlated, then the previous model has omitted variable bias and we cannot be confident that the estimated effect is due to military integration and not to other types of external constraints.

4.2 Comparing Military, Political, and Economic Integration

Political integration and economic integration are measured using a similar method to that of military integration. For political integration, I use a count of the number of OECD partners in each international organization that the state belongs to. Economic integration is operationalized as the sum of a state’s imports and exports with OECD partners. Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for military integration (degree), political integration, and economic integration. While the correlations are not alarmingly high, it is possible that portions of the effects in Table 1 have been misattributed.

Table 2: Selected Sample Correlation

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<th>Economic</th>
<th>Military (Degree)</th>
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<td>0.69</td>
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<td>Military (Degree)</td>
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<td>0.69</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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Note: Correlation coefficients range from -1 to 1. These values correspond to the sample of states that experienced a resistance movement. The correlations in the full sample, which are not reported here, are slightly lower.

7To operationalize political integration, I use the Correlates of War’s International Governmental Organizations dataset (Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke, 2004). For economic integration, I use the Correlates of War’s International Trade data (Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins, 2009).
As shown in Table 3, political and economic integration are included in Model 5, with severe repression as the dependent variable, and Model 6, with any repression as the dependent variable. In Model 5, none of the integration variables are found to have a significant effect. In Model 6, economic integration is found to have a negative effect on the use of repression. As would be expected from the correlations in Table 2, the individual effects of the correlated measures of integration in the fully specified models in Table 3 are unreliable. However, a likelihood ratio test suggests that we can reject the null hypothesis that models with integration measures are not distinguishable from models without integration measures. Thus, the findings
suggest that integration with liberal democracies matters, even if the findings do not produce reliable estimates of the effect of individual measures of integration.

To explore further the relationships in these data, Models 7, 8, and 9 look at including the measures of integration pairwise, rather than all at once. The coefficient on military integration is negative and statistically significant when included with either economic integration (Model 8) or with political integration (Model 7), while neither political integration nor economic integration is found to have a significant effect. In Model 9, where military integration is excluded, political integration is found to have a significant effect while economic integration is not. Overall, it is clear that military integration with liberal democracies lessens the severity of state repression. Political and economic integration, however, also likely contribute to the reduction in severity.

5 Conclusion

Political campaigns are a relatively common occurrence whose outcomes range from democratization and political reform to autocratization and civil war. Sometimes, governments harshly repress campaigns, and sometimes they do not. Building from the finding in the civil-military relations literature that political campaigns create agency loss between the leader and the military, I argue that the military’s preferences toward repression are influenced by its relationship with liberal democracies. In particular, liberal democracies have strong norms against the use of repression and these norms may be transferred through various types of military cooperation. Furthermore, the degree of military integration creates a channel that liberal democracies, states that face costs for human rights violations by their friends, can leverage. Leveraging the military is particularly effective at limiting repression because the military’s explicit or implicit consent, if not outright assistance, is required for the state to severely repress.

The analysis suggests that military integration with liberal democracies does not prevent repression, but it does limit its severity. These results provide one benefit to expanding multinational security cooperation initiatives involving liberal democracies. This includes the various cooperative policies that are included in the measure of military cooperation used here (arms transfers, alliances, military exercises, and peacekeeping and combat operations), as well as the long list of additional security policies that states have begun to internationalize, such as profession military education. Furthermore, although much military cooperation occurs with
liberal democracies, other states and regional security organizations also engage in such behavior. While this research suggests that liberal democracies are one source of constraint because of their own norms and interests, it makes no claims as to the effect of military cooperation with other types of states. Would military cooperation with strong-armed states that are quick to resort to military force encourage their security partners to do the same? More research along these lines is needed.
6 Appendix

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<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
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<td>Extm Rep</td>
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<td>Any Rep</td>
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*p < 0.05

Table 4: Selection Equation: Base Models
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*p < 0.05

Table 5: Selection Stage: All Variables and Pairwise Comparisons
References


**URL:** [http://goo.gl/RGrhe3](http://goo.gl/RGrhe3)