

PSCI 7330
International Conflict
FALL 2019

Instructor: Vito D'Orazio

Time and Location: Thursday 7:00-9:45pm, GR 4.208

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Office Hours: Wednesday 10:00am-12:00pm, GR 3.108D

Course Goals and Overview

This course examines the scholarly research on international conflict with a particular emphasis on the causes of conflict and conditions for peace. Studying interstate conflict entails a deep understanding of the complexities of the international system, relations between particular sets of states, domestic politics including sub-state actors and institutions, and decision-making processes. It also entails a knowledge of appropriate research methodologies for assessing theory and for contributing to the progress of the field. As such, readings will be diverse, both theoretically and methodologically.

The readings were selected in an effort to familiarize you with the current state of the literature, and to prepare you to conduct independent research on international conflict and related topics in conflict research. The criteria I used for selecting readings was based on theoretical contribution, methodological contribution, time of publication, and my intuitions on where the field is heading. Note, however, that the literature related to the causes of conflict and conditions for peace is vast. Many excellent articles have been omitted from the core readings.

There are three learning objectives for this course. The first is for students to think critically about existing theories pertaining to international conflict. The second is for students to develop a knowledge of the types of research methods that are used in the study of international conflict. The third learning objective is for students to construct their own theory and hypotheses, or develop new hypotheses using an existing theory, and to assess those hypotheses using an appropriate research method. These three learning objectives will be assessed through class discussion, homework assignments, presentations, and the final project.

Course Requirements

There will be about four articles or one book assigned per week. You are expected to read each in detail and to be prepared to discuss. I will begin each class with prepared comments on the readings that are designed (1) to provide some additional context and organization of

major themes, and (2) to bring forth important issues that I see in this set of readings. While I will lead the discussion, this is not a lecture. I expect meaningful contributions from each student. Your submitted questions, in addition to some of my own, will help spark discussion.

In addition to the core readings, for each week I have listed additional readings. This is not intended to be an inclusive list, but rather a place to start if you are interested in reading further. As the semester progresses, and as new material is published, I may add to the list of additional readings. At the end of the syllabus, I included a section of articles that are primarily methodological or philosophical, but address issues that we should consider when studying international conflict. It is not required that you read from the additional readings or methodological sections.

Final Grade Composition

Attendance and participation	20%
Homework assignments	30%
Final paper	40%
Final presentation	10%

Attendance and participation (20%)

Submit the homework assignments on time, show up, be attentive, and participate to get full credit. I expect all students to engage in discussion every class. The purpose is not only to demonstrate that you have read, but also that you have thought critically about the readings and are working to apply theories and methods to your own research questions.

Homework assignments (30%)

Each of the five homework assignments are worth six points. Late assignments will not be accepted. If you miss class, you are still required to submit the assignment. If for any reason you cannot complete the assignment, you must notify me before the assignment is due and we can make arrangements to complete the work. Students are required to submit assignments through eLearning by the start of class on the day the assignment is due.

The homework assignments emphasize theoretical thinking and empirical evaluation. The goal is synthesis of published worked to develop and explore research questions. If you are a Master's student, you may focus on policy problems and prescriptions in lieu of research questions. Assignments are largely front-loaded, to give you more time at the end of the course to focus on your final project.

Final Project (50%)

The final project consists of both a presentation (10%) and a paper (40%). For the final project, students will write and present a paper that is suitable for a conference presentation. The final paper should take the form of a research paper prepared for submission to a peer-reviewed journal.

For the final project, students are required to write an original research paper **or** a replication **and** extension of an existing research paper. The quality you should aim for is FCP: “First Conference Presentation.” For me (and, therefore, for this course), FCP means that your paper should have a complete theoretical argument with clearly stated causal mechanisms and hypotheses, an appropriate research method, and results that are used to assess the stated hypotheses.

All students are required to obtain my approval for their final project. Final papers are due by midnight on Tuesday, December 10.

Short papers and presentations

Students will write two short papers, and give two presentations, throughout the semester. These papers and presentations are intended to demonstrate progress toward the final project, and to provide students with feedback. The papers will be graded on a three point scale, but these grades will not count toward the final project. The final project is a stand-alone grade.

Short paper 1 is the question—this should be no more than one page. The accompanying presentation will be a one minute “elevator pitch.” That is, your job is to identify an interesting question and be able to pitch it in one minute.

Short paper 2 is the proposal—here is where you will elaborate on your question and hypotheses, specify a research design including data and statistical methods (if appropriate), preview findings if there are any, and/or discuss why the findings are important for the existing literature. The accompanying presentation will be no longer than five minutes, and can include a slidedeck.

Grade Scale

A	≥ 93%	B	= 83-86%	C	73-76%
A-	= 90-92%	B-	= 80-82%	F	≤ 72%
B+	= 87-89%	C+	= 77-79%		

See <https://catalog.utdallas.edu/2018/graduate/policies> for additional information about university grading policies.

UT Dallas Syllabus Policies and Procedures

The information contained in the following link constitutes the University’s policies and procedures segment of the course syllabus: <http://go.utdallas.edu/syllabus-policies>.

Required Texts

- Waltz, K. N. (1959). *Man, the state, and war: A theoretical analysis*. Columbia University Press

- Goertz, G., Diehl, P. F., and Balas, A. (2016). *The puzzle of peace: The evolution of peace in the international system*. Oxford University Press
- Valeriano, B., Jensen, B. M., and Maness, R. C. (2018). *Cyber strategy: The evolving character of power and coercion*. Oxford University Press

Course Outline

Day 1: Introductions, Syllabus, and IR

August 22

- Deutsch, K. W. (1972). *Peace Research: The Need, the Problems, and the Prospects*. Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT. University lecture
- Lake, D. A. (2011). Why “isms” are evil: Theory, epistemology, and academic sects as impediments to understanding and progress. *International Studies Quarterly*, 55(2):465–480
- Mearsheimer, J. J. and Walt, S. M. (2013). Leaving theory behind: Why simplistic hypothesis testing is bad for international relations. *European Journal of International Relations*, 19(3):427–457
- Ward, M. D. (2017). Do we have too much theory in international relations or do we need less? waltz was wrong, tetlock was right. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*

Day 2: Man, the State, and War

August 29

- Waltz, K. N. (1959). *Man, the state, and war: A theoretical analysis*. Columbia University Press

Day 3: The Puzzle of Peace

September 5

*Homework #1 due

- Goertz, G., Diehl, P. F., and Balas, A. (2016). *The puzzle of peace: The evolution of peace in the international system*. Oxford University Press

Day 4: Bargaining Theory

September 12

- Jervis, R. (1988). War and misperception. *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18(4):675–700
- Fearon, J. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. *International Organization*, 49:379–414
- Powell, R. (2006). War as a commitment problem. *International organization*, 60(01):169–203

- Gartzke, E. (1999). War is in the error term. *International Organization*, 53(03):567–587

Day 5: Power**September 19*****Homework #2 due**

- Sullivan, P. L. (2007). War aims and war outcomes: Why powerful states lose limited wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 51(3):496–524
- Reed, W., Clark, D. H., Nordstrom, T., and Hwang, W. (2008). War, power, and bargaining. *The Journal of Politics*, 70(4):1203–1216
- Hegre, H. (2008). Gravitating toward war preponderance may pacify, but power kills. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 52(4):566–589
- Carroll, R. J. and Kenkel, B. (2019). Prediction, proxies, and power. *American Journal of Political Science*, 63(3):577–593

Day 6: Deterrence**September 26**

- Huth, P. K. and Russett, B. (1984). What makes deterrence work: Cases from 1900–1980. *World Politics*, 36(4):496–526
- Signorino, C. S. and Tarar, A. (2006). A unified theory and test of extended immediate deterrence. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(3):586–605
- McManus, R. W. (2018). Making it personal: The role of leader-specific signals in extended deterrence. *The Journal of Politics*, 80(3):982–995
- McManus, R. W. and Nieman, M. D. (2019). Identifying the level of major power support signaled for protégés: A latent measure approach. *Journal of Peace Research*, 56(3):364–378

Day 7: Cyber Strategy**October 3*****Homework #3 due**

- Valeriano, B., Jensen, B. M., and Maness, R. C. (2018). *Cyber strategy: The evolving character of power and coercion*. Oxford University Press

Day 8: Alliances**October 10**

- Leeds, B. A. (2003). Do alliances deter aggression? the influence of military alliances on the initiation of militarized interstate disputes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(3):427–439
- Fang, S., Johnson, J. C., and Leeds, B. A. (2014). To concede or to resist? the restraining effect of military alliances. *International Organization*, 68(04):775–809

- Kenwick, M. R., Vasquez, J. A., and Powers, M. A. (2015). Do alliances really deter? *The Journal of Politics*, 77(4):943–954
- The following three articles are part of an exchange:
 - Morrow, J. D. (2017). When do defensive alliances provoke rather than deter? *The Journal of Politics*, 79(1):341–345
 - Kenwick, M. R. and Vasquez, J. A. (2017). Defense pacts and deterrence: Caveat emptor. *The Journal of Politics*, 79(1):329–334
 - Leeds, B. A. and Johnson, J. C. (2017). Theory, data, and deterrence: A response to kenwick, vasquez, and powers. *The Journal of Politics*, 79(1):335–340

Day 9: The “Peaces” Part 1**October 17*****Homework #4 due**

- Gelpi, C. (2017). Democracies in conflict: The role of public opinion, political parties, and the press in shaping security policy. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 61(9):1925–1949
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M., and Smith, A. (1999). An institutional explanation of the democratic peace. *American Political Science Review*, 93(4):791–807
- Oneal, J. R. and Russett, B. M. (1999). The kantian peace: The pacific benefits of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations, 1885-1992. *World Politics*, 52(1):1–37
- Tomz, M. and Weeks, J. (2013). Public opinion and the democratic peace. *American Political Science Review*, 107(3):849–865

Day 10: The “Peaces” Part 2**October 24*****Note: 5 articles for this week**

- Weeks, J. L. (2012). Strongmen and straw men: Authoritarian regimes and the initiation of international conflict. *American Political Science Review*, 106(02):326–347
- Stein, R. M. (2015). War and revenge: Explaining conflict initiation by democracies. *American Political Science Review*, 109(3):556–573
- Gartzke, E. (2007). The capitalist peace. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1):166–191
- Mousseau, M. (2019). The end of war: How a robust marketplace and liberal hegemony are leading to perpetual world peace. *International Security*, 44(1):160–196
- Hegre, H., Bernhard, M., and Teorell, J. (2019). Civil society and the democratic peace. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, page 0022002719850620

Day 11: The “Peaces” Part 3**October 31*****Homework #5 due**

- Gibler, D. M. (2007). Bordering on peace: Democracy, territorial issues, and conflict. *International Studies Quarterly*, 51(3):509–532
- Simmons, B. A. (2005). Rules over real estate trade, territorial conflict, and international borders as institution. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(6):823–848
- Park, J. and Colaresi, M. (2014). Safe across the border: The continued significance of the democratic peace when controlling for stable borders. *International Studies Quarterly*, 58(1):118–125
- Carter, D. B. and Goemans, H. (2011). The making of the territorial order: New borders and the emergence of interstate conflict. *International Organization*, 65(2):275–309

Day 12: Audience Costs**November 7*****Paper #1 is due by the start of class.*****All students present research question**

- Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. *American Political Science Review*, 88(3):577–592
- Weeks, J. (2008). Autocratic audience costs: Regime type and signaling resolve. *International Organization*, 62(1):35–64
- Kertzer, J. D. and Brutger, R. (2016). Decomposing audience costs: bringing the audience back into audience cost theory. *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(1):234–249
- Schultz, K. A. (2012). Why we needed audience costs and what we need now. *Security Studies*, 21(3):369–375

Day 13: Leaders**November 14**

- Horowitz, M. C. and Stam, A. C. (2014). How prior military experience influences the future militarized behavior of leaders. *International Organization*, 68(03):527–559
- Croco, S. E. (2011). The decider’s dilemma: Leader culpability, war outcomes, and domestic punishment. *American Political Science Review*, 105(03):457–477
- Saunders, E. N. (2017). No substitute for experience: Presidents, advisers, and information in group decision making. *International Organization*, 71(S1):S219–S247
- Herrmann, R. K. (2017). How attachments to the nation shape beliefs about the world: A theory of motivated reasoning. *International Organization*, 71(S1):S61–S84

Day 14: Civil Wars**November 21*****Paper #2 is due by the start of class.*****All students present the proposal**

- Salehyan, I. (2008b). No shelter here: Rebel sanctuaries and international conflict. *The Journal of Politics*, 70(01):54–66
- Gleditsch, K. S., Salehyan, I., and Schultz, K. (2008). Fighting at home, fighting abroad: How civil wars lead to international disputes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 52(4):479–506
- Colgan, J. D. (2013). Domestic revolutionary leaders and international conflict. *World Politics*, 65(4):656–690
- Carter, D. B. (2015). The compellence dilemma: international disputes with violent groups. *International Studies Quarterly*, 59(3):461–476

Day 15: Presentations**December 5*****All students, final presentations.*****Final papers are due by midnight on Tuesday, December 10.**

Additional Readings

Methodological Articles

- Poast, P. (2010). (mis) using dyadic data to analyze multilateral events. *Political Analysis*, 18(4):403–425
- Hafner-Burton, E. M., Kahler, M., and Montgomery, A. H. (2009). Network analysis for international relations. *International Organization*, 63(3):559–592
- Mearsheimer, J. J. and Walt, S. M. (2013). Leaving theory behind: Why simplistic hypothesis testing is bad for international relations. *European Journal of International Relations*, 19(3):427–457
- Beck, N., King, G., and Zeng, L. (2000). Improving quantitative studies of international conflict: A conjecture. *American Political Science Review*, 94(1):21–35
- Jenke, L. and Gelpi, C. (2016). Theme and variations historical contingencies in the causal model of interstate conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, page 0022002715615190
- Zhukov, Y. M. and Stewart, B. M. (2013). Choosing your neighbors: Networks of diffusion in international relations¹. *International Studies Quarterly*, 57(2):271–287
- Walt, S. M. (1999). Rigor or rigor mortis? rational choice and security studies. *International Security*, 23(4):5–48
- Goodwin, P. and Wright, G. (2010). The limits of forecasting methods in anticipating rare events. *Technological forecasting and social change*, 77(3):355–368
- Ward, M. D., Greenhill, B. D., and Bakke, K. M. (2010). The perils of policy by p-value: Predicting civil conflicts. *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(4):363–375
- Gleditsch, K. S. and Ward, M. D. (2013). Forecasting is difficult, especially about the future using contentious issues to forecast interstate disputes. *Journal of Peace Research*, 50(1):17–31
- Brandt, P. T., Freeman, J. R., and Schrodtt, P. A. (2011). Real time, time series forecasting of inter-and intra-state political conflict. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 28(1):41–64
- Reed, W. (2000). A unified statistical model of conflict onset and escalation. *American Journal of Political Science*, pages 84–93
- Leamer, E. E. (1983). Let's take the con out of econometrics. *The American Economic Review*, 73(1):31–43
- Leamer, E. E. (1985). Sensitivity analyses would help. *The American Economic Review*, 75(3):308–313
- King, G. (1989). Event count models for international relations: Generalizations and applications. *International Studies Quarterly*, 33(2):123–147

- Carter, D. B. and Signorino, C. S. (2010). Back to the future: Modeling temporal dependence in binary data. *Political Analysis*, 18(3):271–292
- Schrodtt, P. A. (2014). Seven deadly sins of contemporary quantitative political analysis. *Journal of Peace Research*, 51(2):287–300

Background:

- Valeriano, B. and Vasquez, J. A. (2010). Identifying and classifying complex interstate wars. *International Studies Quarterly*, 54(2):561–582
- Bremer, S. A. (1992). Dangerous dyads conditions affecting the likelihood of interstate war, 1816-1965. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36(2):309–341
- Regan, P. M. (2014). Bringing peace back in: Presidential address to the peace science society, 2013. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 31(4):345–356

Level of Analysis:

- Singer, J. D. (1960). International conflict three levels of analysis. *World Politics*, 12(03):453–461
- Singer, J. D. (1961). The level-of-analysis problem in international relations. *World Politics*, 14(01):77–92

Deterrence:

- Waltz, K. N. (1988). The origins of war in neorealist theory. *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18(4):615–628
- Huth, P. K. (1988). Extended deterrence and the outbreak of war. *American Political Science Review*, 82(2):423–443
- Huth, P., Gelpi, C., and Bennett, D. S. (1993). The escalation of great power militarized disputes: Testing rational deterrence theory and structural realism. *American Political Science Review*, 87(3):609–623
- Rider, T. J., Findley, M. G., and Diehl, P. F. (2011). Just part of the game? arms races, rivalry, and war. *Journal of Peace Research*, 48 (1):111–118
- Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. *World Politics*, 30(2):167–214
- Kydd, A. (1997a). Game theory and the spiral model. *World Politics*, 49(03):371–400
- Diehl, P. F. and Crescenzi, M. J. (1998). Reconfiguring the arms race-war debate. *Journal of Peace Research*, pages 111–118
- Van Evera, S. (1984). The cult of the offensive and the origins of the first world war. *International Security*, 9(1):58–107

- Glaser, C. L. (1997). The security dilemma revisited. *World politics*, 50:171–201
- Benson, B. V., Meirowitz, A., and Ramsay, K. W. (2014). Inducing deterrence through moral hazard in alliance contracts. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 58(2):307–335
- Fearon, J. D. (1991). Counterfactuals and hypothesis testing in political science. *World politics*, 43(02):169–195

Alliances:

- Fuhrmann, M. and Sechser, T. S. (2014). Signaling alliance commitments: Hand-tying and sunk costs in extended nuclear deterrence. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(4):919–935
- Morrow, J. D. (2000). Alliances: Why write them down? *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3:63–83
- Kinne, B. J. (2013). Network dynamics and the evolution of international cooperation. *American Political Science Review*, 107(4):766–785
- Kydd, A. (1997b). Sheep in sheep’s clothing: Why security seekers do not fight each other. *Security Studies*, 7(1):114–155
- Maoz, Z. and Joyce, K. A. (2016). The effects of shocks on international networks changes in the attributes of states and the structure of international alliance networks. *Journal of Peace Research*, page 0022343316632854
- Poast, P. (2013). Can issue linkage improve treaty credibility? buffer state alliances as a ‘hard case’. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 57(5):739–764
- Kinne, B. J. (2016). Agreeing to arm bilateral weapons agreements and the global arms trade. *Journal of Peace Research*, 53(3):359–377
- Benson, B. V., Bentley, P. R., and Ray, J. L. (2013). Ally provocateur why allies do not always behave. *Journal of Peace Research*, 50(1):47–58
- Cranmer, S. J., Desmarais, B. A., and Menninga, E. J. (2012). Complex dependencies in the alliance network. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 29(3):279–313
- Walt, S. M. (1985). Alliance formation and the balance of world power. *International security*, 9(4):3–43

Power and Polarity:

- Deutsch, K. W. and Singer, J. D. (1964). Multipolar power systems and international stability. *World Politics*, 16(03):390–406
- Waltz, K. N. (1964). The stability of a bipolar world. *Daedalus*, pages 881–909
- Maoz, Z. (2006). Network polarization, network interdependence, and international conflict, 1816-2002. *Journal of Peace Research*, 43(4):391–411

- Huth, P., Bennett, D. S., and Gelpi, C. (1992). System uncertainty, risk propensity, and international conflict among the great powers. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36(3):478–517
- Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. *International organization*, 46(02):391–425
- Beardsley, K. and Asal, V. (2009). Winning with the bomb. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53(2):278–301
- Lemke, D. and Werner, S. (1996). Power parity, commitment to change, and war. *International Studies Quarterly*, 40(2):235–260
- Wohlforth, W. C. (1999). The stability of a unipolar world. *International security*, 24(1):5–41
- Monteiro, N. P. (2012). Unrest assured: Why unipolarity is not peaceful. *International security*, 36(3):9–40

Bargaining:

- Reiter, D. (2003). Exploring the bargaining model of war. *Perspectives on Politics*, 1(01):27–43
- Powell, R. (2004). Bargaining and learning while fighting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(2):344–361
- Wagner, R. H. (2000). Bargaining and war. *American Journal of Political Science*, pages 469–484
- Slantchev, B. L. (2003). The power to hurt: Costly conflict with completely informed states. *American Political Science Review*, 97(01):123–133

Audience Costs:

- Slantchev, B. L. (2006). Politicians, the media, and domestic audience costs. *International Studies Quarterly*, 50(2):445–477
- Levendusky, M. S. and Horowitz, M. C. (2012). When backing down is the right decision: Partisanship, new information, and audience costs. *The Journal of Politics*, 74(02):323–338
- Fearon, J. D. (1997). Signaling foreign policy interests: Tying hands versus sinking costs. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41(1):68–90
- Partell, P. J. and Palmer, G. (1999). Audience costs and interstate crises: An empirical assessment of fearon's model of dispute outcomes. *International Studies Quarterly*, 43(2):389–405
- Allee, T. L. and Huth, P. K. (2006). Legitimizing dispute settlement: International legal rulings as domestic political cover. *American Political Science Review*, 100(02):219–234

- Kertzer, J. D. (2013). Making sense of isolationism: foreign policy mood as a multilevel phenomenon. *The Journal of Politics*, 75(01):225–240
- Tomz, M. (2007). Domestic audience costs in international relations: An experimental approach. *International Organization*, 61(04):821–840
- Shultz, K. (2001). Looking for audience costs. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(1):32–60

Trade and International Organizations

- Pevehouse, J. and Russett, B. (2006). Democratic international governmental organizations promote peace. *International Organization*, 60(04):969–1000
- Hafner-Burton, E. M. and Montgomery, A. H. (2006). Power positions international organizations, social networks, and conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50(1):3–27
- Hegre, H., Oneal, J. R., and Russett, B. (2010). Trade does promote peace: New simultaneous estimates of the reciprocal effects of trade and conflict. *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(6):763 – 774
- Ward, M. D., Siverson, R. M., and Cao, X. (2007). Disputes, democracies, and dependencies: A reexamination of the kantian peace. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(3):583–601
- Boehmer, C., Gartzke, E., and Nordstrom, T. (2004). Do intergovernmental organizations promote peace? *World Politics*, 57(01):1–38
- Wilson, M., Davis, D. R., and Murdie, A. (2016). The view from the bottom networks of conflict resolution organizations and international peace. *Journal of Peace Research*, 53(3):442–458
- Mitchell, S. M. (2002). A kantian system? democracy and third-party conflict resolution. *American Journal of Political Science*, pages 749–759
- Kinne, B. J. (2012). Multilateral trade and militarized conflict: Centrality, openness, and asymmetry in the global trade network. *The Journal of Politics*, 74(01):308–322
- Barbieri, K. (1996). Economic interdependence: A path to peace or a source of interstate conflict? *Journal of Peace Research*, 33(1):29–49
- Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. *International Organization*, 42(3):427–460
- Valentino, B., Huth, P., and Croco, S. (2006). Covenants without the sword: International law and the protection of civilians in times of war. *World Politics*, 58(3):339–377

Climate Change and Natural Resources

- Gat, A. (2009). So why do people fight? evolutionary theory and the causes of war. *European Journal of International Relations*, 15(4):571–599

- Devlin, C. and Hendrix, C. S. (2014). Trends and triggers redux: Climate change, rainfall, and interstate conflict. *Political Geography*, 43:27–39
- Hensel, P. R., Mitchell, S. M., Sowers, T. E., and Thyne, C. L. (2008). Bones of contention comparing territorial, maritime, and river issues. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 52(1):117–143
- Koubi, V., Spilker, G., Böhmelt, T., and Bernauer, T. (2014). Do natural resources matter for interstate and intrastate armed conflict? *Journal of Peace Research*, 51(2):227–243
- Caselli, F., Morelli, M., and Rohner, D. (2013). The geography of inter-state resource wars. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research
- Colgan, J. D. (2010). Oil and revolutionary governments: Fuel for international conflict. *International Organization*, 64(04):661–694
- Acemoglu, D., Golosov, M., Tsyvinski, A., and Yared, P. (2011). A dynamic theory of resource wars. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research
- Gleditsch, N. P., Furlong, K., Hegre, H., Lacina, B., and Owen, T. (2006). Conflicts over shared rivers: Resource scarcity or fuzzy boundaries? *Political Geography*, 25(4):361–382

Autocratic Regimes

- Peceny, M., Beer, C. C., and Sanchez-Terry, S. (2002). Dictatorial peace? *American Political Science Review*, 96(01):15–26
- Pickering, J. and Kisangani, E. F. (2010). Diversionary despots? comparing autocracies' propensities to use and to benefit from military force. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(2):477–493
- Debs, A. and Goemans, H. E. (2010). Regime type, the fate of leaders, and war. *American Political Science Review*, 104(03):430–445
- Geddes, B., Frantz, E., and Wright, J. G. (2014). Military rule. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 17:147–162
- Escribà-Folch, A. (2013). Accountable for what? regime types, performance, and the fate of outgoing dictators, 1946–2004. *Democratization*, 20(1):160–185
- Colgan, J. D. and Weeks, J. L. (2015). Revolution, personalist dictatorships, and international conflict. *International Organization*, 69(01):163–194

Territory and Borders

- Gibler, D. M. and Tir, J. (2010). Settled borders and regime type: Democratic transitions as consequences of peaceful territorial transfers. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(4):951–968

- Owsiak, A. P., Diehl, P. F., and Goertz, G. (2016). Border settlement and the movement toward and from negative peace. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, page 0738894216650420
- Owsiak, A. P. (2012). Signing up for peace: International boundary agreements, democracy, and militarized interstate conflict1. *International Studies Quarterly*, 56(1):51–66
- Zacher, M. W. (2001). The territorial integrity norm: International boundaries and the use of force. *International Organization*, 55(02):215–250
- Hassner, R. E. (2003). to halve and to hold: Conflicts over sacred space and the problem of indivisibility. *Security Studies*, 12(4):1–33

Democratic Peace

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